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Abstract
We propose a model in which assets with identical cash flows can trade at different prices.
Agents enter into an infinite-horizon, steady-state market to establish long or short positions.
Both the spot and the asset-lending market operate through search. Short-sellers can endoge-
nously concentrate in one asset because of search externalities and the constraint that they must
deliver the asset they borrowed. As a result, that asset enjoys both greater liquidity, measured
by search times, and a higher lending fee (“specialness”). Liquidity and specialness translate
into price premia that are consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions for
small frictions, and can generate price differentials in line with observed on-the-run premia.
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1 Introduction
In fixed-income markets some bonds trade at lower yields than others with almost identical cash
flows. In the US, for example, just-issued (“on-the-run”) Treasury bonds trade at lower yields than
previously issued (“off-the-run”) bonds maturing on nearby dates. Warga [1992] reports that an
on-the-run portfolio returns on average 55bp below an off-the-run portfolio with matched duration.
Similar phenomena exist in other countries. In Japan, for example, one “benchmark” government
bond trades at a yield of 60bp below other bonds with comparable characteristics.1
How can the yields of bonds with almost identical cash flows differ by more than 50bp? Fi-
nancial economists have suggested two apparently distinct hypotheses. First, on-the-run bonds
are more valuable because they are significantly more liquid than their off-the-run counterparts.
Second, on-the-run bonds constitute better collateral for borrowing money in the repo market.
Namely, loans collateralized by on-the-run bonds offer lower interest rates than their off-the-run
counterparts, a phenomenon referred to as “specialness.”2 These hypotheses, however, can provide
only a partial explanation of the on-the-run phenomenon: one must still explain why assets with
almost identical cash flows can differ in liquidity and specialness.
In this paper we propose a theory of the on-the-run phenomenon. We take the view that
liquidity and specialness are not independent explanations of this phenomenon, but can be explained
simultaneously by short-selling activity. We determine liquidity and specialness endogenously,
explain why they can differ across otherwise identical assets, and study their effect on prices. A
calibration of our model for plausible parameter values can generate price effects of the observed
magnitude.
Our theory is based on the notion that trade in government-bond markets is bilateral and
can involve search. The assumption of bilateral trade captures the over-the-counter structure of
these markets: transactions between dealers and their customers are negotiated over the phone,
and dealers often negotiate bilaterally in the inter-dealer market.3 The extent of search depends
1For US evidence, see also Amihud and Mendelson [1991], Krishnamurthy [2002], Goldreich, Hanke and Nath
[2002], and Strebulaev [2002]. For Japan, see Mason [1987], Boudoukh and Whitelaw [1991], and Boudoukh and
Whitelaw [1993].
2On liquidity, Sundaresan [2002] reports that trading volume of on-the-run bonds is about ten times larger than
that of off-the-run bonds, and Fleming [2002] reports that bid-ask spreads of off-the-run bills are about five times
larger than when these bills are on-the-run. Specialness is measured by comparing a bond’s repo rate, which is the
interest rate on a loan colateralized by the bond, to the general collateral rate, which is the highest quoted repo rate.
Duffie [1996] reports an average specialness of 66bp for on-the-run bonds and 26bp for their off-the-run counterparts.
3In the US, inter-dealer trading is conducted through brokers. Some brokers operate automated trading systems,
structured as electronic limit-order books. Other brokers, however, operate voice-based systems in which orders are
negotiated over the phone. Barclay, Hendershott and Kotz [2002] report that automated systems account for about
85% of trading volume for on-the-run bonds, but the situation is reversed for off-the-run bonds. To explain this
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on the size of a transaction and the type of bond. An investor can execute a small transaction
in an on-the-run bond almost instantly by contacting a dealer. Large transactions, however, can
take more time, especially for off-the-run bonds. For example, a dealer might be unable to cover a
customer’s buy order from its inventory, thus needing to engage in search. Likewise, a dealer might
be unwilling to acquire a large inventory as a result of a customer’s sell order, and might prefer to
search for end buyers. While search times can be in the order of a few hours, our calibration shows
that even for such times price effects can be significant.
We consider an infinite-horizon, steady-state economy with two risky assets paying the same
cash flow. Trade occurs because agents experience hedging needs to hold long or short positions.
Upon experiencing a need to hold a long position, an agent enters the market seeking to buy one
of the assets. He then holds the asset until the hedging need disappears, and then seeks to sell.
During the time he is holding the asset, he can lend it to a short-seller for a fee. This corresponds
to a repo transaction in our model, and the fee to repo specialness.4 Conversely, upon experiencing
a need to hold a short position, an agent enters the market seeking to borrow one of the assets. She
then seeks to sell the asset, and when the hedging need disappears, she seeks to buy the same asset
back and return it to the lender. Both the spot and the repo market operate through search and
bilateral bargaining. For simplicity, we abstract away from dealers and adopt the standard search
framework (e.g., Diamond [1982]) where agents search for counterparties directly.5
Our model has multiple equilibria: a symmetric one where short-sellers borrow both assets,
and asymmetric ones where they concentrate in one asset, declining any opportunities to borrow
the other. This is because of search externalities. The more agents short an asset, the greater the
asset’s seller pool becomes. The asset’s buyer pool also increases because of the short-sellers who
need to buy the asset back. A larger buyer and seller pool implies lower search times, and the
enhanced liquidity attracts more short-sellers. Thus, our theory can explain differences in liquidity
between otherwise identical assets, consistent with the on-the-run phenomenon.
While the general notion of search externalities is well-understood, its application to the on-
the-run phenomenon is subtle. Absent the short-sellers, there would be no differences in liquidity.
Indeed, assets would have a common buyer pool, consisting of the agents seeking to establish long
positions. Therefore, they would be equally easy to sell. The same would hold even with short-
phenomenon, they propose a search-based model.
4We describe repo transactions at the beginning of Section 4. See also Duffie [1996] and Fisher [2002], among
others, for more detailed descriptions.
5Of course, the search framework is only an idealization of price formation in actual bond markets - but so is the
Walrasian auction. We expand on this point and provide further arguments in support of the search framework in
Section 4.1.
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sellers, if these were allowed to deliver any asset and not necessarily the one they borrowed. The
delivery constraint effectively “locks” short-sellers into buying one asset, thus generating asset-
specific buyer pools.6
In the asymmetric equilibria, assets differ not only in liquidity but also in specialness. Indeed,
because of the search friction, asset lenders can extract some of the short-sellers’ surplus. This
surplus is positive only for the more liquid asset because it is the one that short-sellers are willing
to borrow. Therefore, only that asset commands a positive fee and hence is “on special.” The
fee constitutes an additional cash flow derived from the asset, raising its price by a specialness
premium. This premium is above and beyond the one associated to the asset’s superior liquidity.
We show that the existence of the two premia is consistent with no-arbitrage: agents cannot profit
by buying one asset and shorting the other.
While our theory can identify a liquidity and a specialness component of the on-the-run pre-
mium, it also implies that this decomposition should be interpreted with caution. Indeed, since
short-sellers are attracted to the more liquid asset, the asset’s specialness is partly generated from
liquidity. Therefore, the specialness premium can be viewed as an additional liquidity premium.
In fact, our theory implies that liquidity and specialness are linked in an even more fundamental
manner because they are both generated by short-selling activity.
A calibration of our model can generate price effects of the observed magnitude, even for short
search times in the order of a few hours. For short search times, the liquidity premium is small,
and the price effects are mostly generated by the specialness premium. Of course, this does not
mean that liquidity does not matter; it rather means that liquidity can have large effects through
specialness.
Our theory sheds light on several additional aspects of the on-the-run phenomenon. One
puzzling aspect is that off-the-run bonds are viewed by traders as “scarce” and hard to locate,
while at the same time being cheaper than on-the-run bonds. In our model, off-the-run bonds
are indeed scarce from the viewpoint of short-sellers searching to buy and deliver them. Because,
however, scarcity drives short-sellers away from these bonds, it makes them less liquid and less
attractive to marginal buyers who are the agents seeking to establish long positions. Our theory
also shows that when assets’ issue sizes are sufficiently different the equilibrium becomes unique,
with short-sellers concentrating in the largest-supply asset. Therefore, if one views off-the-run
6The delivery constraint is quite prevalent in actual markets, as can be seen, for example, by the incidence of
short-squeezes. In a short-squeeze, short-sellers have difficulty delivering the asset they borrowed and the asset’s
specialness in the repo market increases dramatically. For a description of short-squeezes see, for example, Dupont
and Sack [1999].
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bonds as being in smaller effective supply,7 our theory suggests that they are less likely to attract
short-sellers and thus less liquid. Finally, our theory allows for an analysis of market integration,
achieved when short-sellers are allowed to deliver either asset.8 We show that integration raises
liquidity and welfare but not necessarily the price level.
This paper is closely related to Duffie’s [1996] theory of repo specialness. In Duffie, short-sellers
need to borrow an asset and sell it in the market, incurring an exogenous transaction cost. Assets
that can be sold at a low cost are on special because they are in high demand by short-sellers. The
main difference with Duffie is that instead of explaining specialness taking liquidity (transaction
costs) as exogenous, we explain liquidity and specialness simultaneously. Thus, we can explain
why liquidity and specialness might differ for otherwise identical assets. We can also analyze
the effects of issue size, market integration, etc, taking into account the endogenous variation in
liquidity. Krishnamurthy [2002] proposes a model building on Duffie [1996] that links the specialness
premium to an exogenous liquidity premium. This link is also present in our model where the
liquidity premium is endogenous.9
This paper builds on a series of papers by Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen, who are the first
to introduce search in models of asset market equilibrium. Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen [2004b]
consider a model where investors seek to establish long positions, and Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen
[2004a] introduce dealers into that model. Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen [2002] introduce short-
sellers into a different model where the spot market is Walrasian but the repo market operates
through search. They show that specialness arises because of lenders’ bargaining power, exactly as
in this paper. Our focus differs in that we seek to explain differences in liquidity across assets. This
leads us to extend their framework in several technically challenging directions. In particular, we
consider a multi-asset model while they assume only one asset. We also introduce search in both
the spot and the repo market because this is crucial for our explanation.10 Vayanos and Wang
7For example, Amihud and Mendelson [1991] argue that a bond’s effective supply decreases over time as the bond
becomes “locked away” in institutional investors’ portfolios.
8Bennett, Garbade and Kambhu [2000] argue that market integration can be achieved if on- and off-the-run bonds
become standardized in terms of their maturity dates. For example, a two-year bond can be designed to mature on
exactly the same date as a previously-issued five-year bond. The bonds can then be made “fungible,” assigned the
same CUSIP number, and be identical for delivery purposes.
9Empirical studies by Cornell and Shapiro [1989], Jordan and Jordan [1997], Buraschi and Menini [2002], Kr-
ishnamurthy [2002], Moulton [2004], and Graveline and McBrady [2004] show that on-the-run bond prices contain
specialness premia. These papers also provide evidence on exogenous factors shifting the demand and supply of assets
in the repo market. On the demand side, they show that variables proxying for short-selling activity are positively
related to the specialness premium. On the supply side, they show that variables proxying for the availability of the
asset on the repo market are negatively related to the specialness premium. These relationships are consistent with
Duffie [1996] and our model.
10Search in the spot market induces short-sellers to concentrate in one asset. Search in the repo market generates a
positive lending fee, which is necessary to rule out the arbitrage strategy of shorting the on-the-run bond and buying
the off-the-run.
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[2004] and Weill [2004] develop multi-asset models with search, but no short-sellers. We show that
in the presence of short-sellers differences in liquidity arise quite naturally. Moreover, price effects
can be large because of the specialness premium.
This paper is related to the monetary-search literature building on Kiyotaki and Wright [1989]
and Trejos and Wright [1995]. Aiyagari, Wallace and Wright [1996] provide an example of an
economy in which fiat monies (intrinsically worthless and unbacked pieces of paper) endogenously
differ in their price and liquidity. Wallace [2000] analyzes the relative liquidity of currency and
dividend-paying assets in a model based on asset indivisibility. Our relative contribution is to
compare dividend-paying assets as opposed to currency, and introduce short sales. The latter allows
to examine whether price differences between otherwise identical assets can generate arbitrage.
This paper is also related to the literature on equilibrium asset pricing with transaction costs.
(See, for example, Amihud and Mendelson [1986], Constantinides [1986], Aiyagari and Gertler
[1991], Heaton and Lucas [1996], Vayanos [1998], Vayanos and Vila [1999], Huang [2003], and Lo,
Mamaysky and Wang [2004].) Besides endogenizing the transaction costs, we add to that literature
by introducing short-sales.
Pagano [1989] studies the concentration of liquidity across market venues. He shows that
markets can coexist, but the outcome is generally dominated by concentrating trade in one market
and shutting the other.11 Our model differs because we consider concentration across assets rather
than markets. In particular, there is no analogue of a market being shut.
Boudoukh and Whitelaw [1993] propose a theory of the on-the-run phenomenon in which
liquidity is selected by the bond issuer. They show that the issuer can achieve price discrimination
by imposing liquidity differences between otherwise identical bonds. This resembles our result that
relative to market integration, the asymmetric (on-the-run) equilibrium can increase government
revenue but reduce welfare.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, and Section
3 considers the benchmark case where markets are Walrasian. Section 4 assumes that markets
operate through search, and contains our main results. Section 5 extends the model to different
asset supplies and market integration. Section 6 calibrates the model, and Section 7 concludes. All
proofs are in the Appendix.
11See also Ellison and Fudenberg [2003] for a general analysis of the coexistence of markets, and Economides and
Siow [1988] for a spatial model of market formation. See also Admati and Pfleiderer [1988] and Chowdhry and Nanda
[1991] for models where trading is concentrated in a specific time or location because of asymmetric information.
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2 Model
Time is continuous and goes from zero to infinity. There is a riskless asset with an exogenous
return r, and two risky assets paying the same cash flow. Cash flow is described by the cumulative
dividend process
dDt = δdt + σdBt, (1)
where δ and σ are positive constants, and Bt is a standard Brownian motion.12 The risky assets
can differ in their supply, and we denote by Si the number of shares of asset i ∈ {1, 2}.
There is an infinite mass of infinitely-lived risk-averse agents who derive utility from the con-
sumption of a nume´raire good. All agents have the same CARA utility function,
−E
[∫ ∞
0
exp (−αct − βt) dt
]
. (2)
Agents differ in their endowment streams. An agent can either receive an endowment that is
positively correlated with dividends, or one that is negatively correlated, or one that is uncorrelated.
The correlation between endowments and dividend give rise to hedging demands, inducing agents to
trade. We refer to the agents with the negatively correlated endowment as high-valuation because
they have a positive hedging demand. Likewise, we refer to the agents with the positively correlated
endowment as low-valuation, and to those with the uncorrelated endowment as average-valuation.13
Following Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen [2004b], we assume that an agent receives the cumulative
endowment process
det = σe
[
ρtdBt +
√
1− ρ2tdZt
]
, (3)
where σe is a positive constant and Zt is a standard Brownian motion independent of Bt. The
process ρt is the instantaneous correlation between the dividend process and the agent’s endowment
process. We set ρt = −ρ < 0 for high-valuation agents, ρt = ρ > 0 for low-valuation agents, and
ρt = 0 for average-valuation agents. The processes (ρt, Zt) are taken to be pairwise independent
across agents.
12The process (1) is the continuous-time analog of i.i.d. cash flows. In a fixed-income setting, cash flows are
deterministic and the uncertainty arises because of interest rates. Moreover, assets generally have a finite maturity
rather than being infinitely lived. We abstract from these complications to keep the model tractable, but we believe
that the basic intuitions are robust.
13The endowments can be interpreted as a position in a correlated market. For example, low-valuation agents could
have long positions in corporate bonds or mortgage-backed securities, and seek to hedge them by shorting Treasuries.
For a discussion of hedging demand in the Treasury market, see Dupont and Sack [1999].
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There is a continuous flow F of average-valuation agents who switch to high valuation, and a
continuous flow F who switch to low valuation. Conversely, high-valuation agents revert to average
valuation with Poisson intensity κ, and low-valuation agents do the same with Poisson intensity
κ. Thus, in a steady state, the measures of high- and low-valuation agents are F/κ and F/κ,
respectively. Given that the measure of average-valuation agents is infinite, an individual agent’s
switching intensity from average to high or low valuation is zero.
Agents can hold long, short, or no positions in any asset. Positions must be in multiples of
a “round lot” that we normalize to one share. We are interested in steady-state equilibria where
high-valuation agents are long one share or hold no position, low-valuation agents are short one
share or hold no position, and average-valuation agents stay out of the market. In the following
sections we show that such equilibria exist under appropriate parameter restrictions.
3 Walrasian Equilibrium
In this section we consider the benchmark case where markets are Walrasian. For notational
simplicity, we set A ≡ rα, y ≡ Aσ2/2, x ≡ Aρσσe, and x ≡ Aρσσe.
Proposition 1 In a Walrasian equilibrium, both risky assets trade at the same price p. If
F
κ
>
2∑
i=1
Si +
F
κ
(4)
and
4y > x + x > 2y > x, (5)
then high-valuation agents either buy one share or stay out of the market, low-valuation agents
short one share, average-valuation agents stay out of the market, and the price is
p =
δ + x− y
r
. (6)
That both risky assets trade at the same price follows from no-arbitrage: since assets have the
same cash flow and there are no trading frictions, an agent could make an infinite profit from a price
discrepancy. To explain the intuition for the rest of the proposition, we consider agents’ portfolio-
choice problem. An agent who holds zt shares of the risky assets receives the instantaneous cash
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flow ztdDt +det. In Appendix A we show that the agent chooses zt to maximize the mean-variance
objective
Et(ztdDt + det)− A2 Vart(ztdDt + det)− rpztdt,
where A is the (constant) coefficient of absolute risk aversion of the agent’s value function. From
Equations (1) and (3), this objective is equivalent to
δzt − A2
(
σ2z2t + 2ρtσσezt
)− rpzt ≡ C(ρt, zt)− rpzt,
where C(ρ, z) is the incremental certainty equivalent of holding z shares relative to holding none.
Using the definitions of y, x, x, we can write the certainty equivalent as C(ρ, z) = (δ+x)z−yz2 for
a high-valuation agent, C(ρ, z) = (δ−x)z−yz2 for a low-valuation agent, and C(0, z) ≡ δz−yz2 for
an average-valuation agent. The parameter y measures the cost of bearing risk, and the parameters
x and x measure the hedging benefits.
The aggregate asset supply is the sum of the supplies Si, i ∈ {1, 2}, from the issuers, plus
the supply generated by the short-sellers. Let’s guess (and later verify) that low-valuation agents
are the only short-sellers and short one share, in which case the latter supply is equal to their
measure F/κ. Equation (4) then implies that the measure F/κ of high-valuation agents exceeds
the aggregate supply. Therefore, in equilibrium high-valuation agents must be indifferent between
buying one share or none, and the price must equal C(ρ, 1)/r, the present value (PV) of their
certainty equivalent of one share.14 Equation (5) ensures that our guess is verified, i.e., at the price
C(ρ, 1)/r, low-valuation agents find it optimal to short one share and average-valuation agents to
stay out of the market.
4 Search Equilibrium
In this section we assume that markets operate through search and bilateral bargaining. There are
two markets in our economy: the spot market for buying and selling, and the repo market where
short-sellers can borrow an asset. We assume that both operate through search, although they can
14Intuitively, Equation (4) ensures that asset demand, generated by the high-valuation agents, exceeds asset supply.
This implies that buyers are the “long” side of the market and bid the price up to their valuation. Equation (4)
simplifies our analysis in several respects. For example, it ensures the existence of a parameter region in which
short-sellers are the infra-marginal traders (Equation (13)).
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differ in the efficiency of the search process. In Section 4.1 we motivate our basic framework, and in
Section 4.2 we describe agents’ life-cycles and the search process. In Section 4.3 we determine the
measures of the different agent types, in Section 4.4 we solve the agents’ optimization problems,
and in Section 4.5 we solve for the equilibrium. Throughout, we assume that asset supplies are
identical, i.e., S1 = S2 = S, and allow for different supplies in Section 5.
4.1 Basic Framework
We adopt the standard search framework where agents are matched randomly over time in pairs.
This framework captures some elements of the government-bond market: negotiations are mainly
bilateral and locating counterparties can involve search. On the other hand, the framework is
quite stylized. For example, it leaves open the question why agents cannot gather in a centralized
marketplace.
In some sense, every price-formation model is stylized. For example, the Walrasian auction
assumes multilateral trade, but the government-bond market operates mainly in a decentralized
fashion through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, as long as search times are reasonably small,
it is not obvious which model describes the market better. Furthermore, an explanation of the
on-the-run phenomenon requires some sort of friction, which is absent from the Walrasian auction.
Of course, the search framework is not the only way to introduce friction. A leading alternative is
to assume asymmetric information about asset payoffs, but it is unclear what the asymmetries are
in the government-bond market.15 Perhaps other alternatives could be explored, but search offers
a analytically tractable and parsimonious one.16
Before turning to our model of the repo market, we recall the mechanics of a repo transaction.
In a repo transaction a lender turns his asset to a borrower in exchange for cash. At maturity the
borrower returns the asset, and the lender returns the cash together with some previously-agreed
interest-rate payment, called the “repo rate.” Hence, a repo transaction is effectively a loan of cash
collateralized by the asset. Treasury securities differ in their repo rates. Most of them share the
same rate, called the “general collateral rate,” which is the highest quoted repo rate and is close
to the Fed Funds Rate. The specialness of an asset is defined as the difference between the general
collateral rate and its repo rate. In our model, instead of assuming that the lender pays a repo rate
15See Admati and Pfleiderer [1989] for an asymmetric-information model where identical assets can differ in liquidity.
16A basic property of the search framework is that the time to execute a transaction decreases in the number of
potential counterparties. For example, if short-sellers concentrate in one asset, this asset will have a larger buyer and
seller pool, and be easier to trade. The basic mechanisms that we identify in this paper should carry to any model
that shares this property.
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to the borrower, we assume that the borrower pays a flow fee w to the lender. Hence, the “implied”
repo rate is the difference r − w/p between the risk-free rate and the lending fee per dollar, and
the specialness is simply w/p.
Finally, we impose from now on a simplifying restriction on agents’ portfolios. We assume
that agents can either hold a long position of one share, or a short position of one share, or no
position. Precluding long and short positions of multiple shares is relatively innocuous. Indeed,
Section 3 shows that agents can choose to limit themselves to one share because of risk aversion.
The less innocuous part of the constraint is to preclude arbitrage portfolios of offsetting long and
short positions. To impose the discipline of no-arbitrage on the market, we introduce an additional
agent group, the “arbitrageurs.” These are average-valuation agents who never switch to high or
low valuation, and who can hold either one of the three portfolios above or an arbitrage portfolio
that is one share long and one short. We assume that arbitrageurs have infinite measure so that
they can take an unlimited collective position.17
4.2 Agents’ Life-Cycles and the Search Process
We look for equilibria in which portfolio decisions resemble those in the Walrasian case, namely,
high-valuation agents seek to buy one share of an asset, low-valuation agents seek to short one
share, and average-valuation agents (including arbitrageurs) stay out of the market. Agents’ life-
cycles in these equilibria are illustrated in the flow diagram of Figure 1. A high-valuation agent is
initially a high-valuation buyer b, who seeks a seller of either asset in the spot market. If he reverts
to average valuation before meeting a seller, he exits the market. Otherwise, if he meets a seller
of asset i ∈ {1, 2}, he buys the asset. He then becomes a lender i of asset i in the repo market,
seeking a borrower. If he reverts to average valuation before meeting a borrower, he exits the repo
market and becomes a seller si of asset i in the spot market. Otherwise, if he meets a borrower
and there are gains from trade, he lends his asset and becomes a high-valuation non-searcher ni.
After that time, he can either become a seller si, or a lender i, or can directly exit the market. We
postpone the precise description of these transitions to the next paragraph. Lastly, a low-valuation
agent is initially a borrower bo, who seeks a lender in the repo market. If she reverts to average
valuation before meeting a lender, she exits the market. Otherwise, if she meets a lender of asset i
and there are gains from trade, she borrows the asset.
17Alternatively, we could assume that all agents can hold the arbitrage portfolio, and do away with the arbitrageurs.
We return to this issue in Footnote 27.
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Figure 1: Partial Flow Diagram.
In the diagram, boxes represent investors’ types and arrows transitions between types.
We next describe the evolution of a borrower-lender match over time, specifying the outcomes
when one of the parties reverts to average valuation and wants to end the match. (Figure 2
augments the flow diagram of Figure 1 to include the associated transitions.) Once matched, the
lender i becomes a high-valuation non-searcher ni, and the borrower bo becomes a low-valuation
seller si of asset i. If agent si reverts to average valuation before meeting a buyer, she delivers the
asset to agent ni and exits the market, while agent ni becomes a lender i. If instead it is agent
ni who reverts to average valuation, agent si delivers the asset and becomes a borrower bo, while
agent ni becomes a seller si. Otherwise, if agent si meets a buyer, she sells the asset and becomes
a low-valuation non-searcher ni. If she reverts to average valuation after that time, she becomes a
buyer bi of asset i, and upon meeting a seller she buys and delivers the asset. If instead it is agent
ni who reverts to average valuation, the low-valuation agent (ni or bi) is unable to deliver instantly
because of search. In that event, we assume that agent ni seizes some cash collateral, previously
posted by the low-valuation agent, and exits the market.18
18 This assumption is for simplicity. An alternative assumption is that the low-valuation agent can search for the
asset under a late-delivery penalty, but this would complicate the model without changing the basic intuitions.
In Appendix D we show that because collateral acts as a transfer, its specific value does not affect any equilibrium
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Figure 2: Full Flow Diagram.
In the diagram, boxes represent investors’ types and arrows transitions between types.
We refer to the different states in agents’ life-cycles as “types.” The types are b and {i, ni, si}i∈{1,2}
for the high-valuation agents, and bo and {si, ni, bi}i∈{1,2} for the low-valuation agents. We denote
by T the set of types, and by µτ the measure of investors of type τ ∈ T . Finally, we denote by bi
the group of all buyers of asset i (both high- and low-valuation), and by si the group of all sellers.
The measures µbi and µsi of these groups are
µbi = µb + µbi (7)
µsi = µsi + µsi. (8)
In each market agents are matched randomly over time in pairs. We assume that an agent
establishes contact with other agents at Poisson arrival times with fixed intensity. Moreover, there is
random matching in that conditional on establishing a contact, all agents are “equally likely” to be
variable except the price of the repo contract: high-valuation agents accept to lend their asset for a lower fee if they
can seize more collateral. To downplay this effect, we set the collateral equal to the utility of a seller si. This ensures
that upon reverting to average valuation, agent ni is equally well off when receiving the asset (thus becoming a seller
si) or the cash collateral.
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contacted. Thus, an agent meets members of a given group with Poisson intensity proportional to
that group’s measure. For example, a buyer in the spot market meets sellers of asset i with Poisson
intensity λµsi, where λ is a parameter measuring the efficiency of spot-market search. Therefore,
the Law of Large Numbers (see Duffie and Sun [2004]) implies that meetings between buyers and
sellers of asset i occur at a deterministic rate λµbiµsi. Likewise, meetings between borrowers and
lenders of asset i occur at a deterministic rate νµboµi, where ν measures the efficiency of repo-
market search. If in equilibrium low-valuation agents decide to borrow only one asset, some of the
borrower-lender meetings do not result in a trade. To account for this, we define the endogenous
variable νi by νi = ν if low-valuation agents borrow asset i, and νi = 0 otherwise.
When two agents meet, they bargain over the terms of trade. Bargaining in the spot market
is over the price pi of asset i, and in the repo market is over the flow fee wi that the borrower
must pay to the lender of asset i over the life of the loan. We assume that bargaining takes place
according to a simple game where the two agents make simultaneous offers. If the offers generate a
set of mutually acceptable prices, trade occurs at the mid-point of that set. Otherwise, the meeting
ends and the agents return to the search pool.
4.3 Demographics
We next derive a set of equations that determine the steady-state measures of the different agent
types. Market clearing requires that assets are held by lenders or sellers, i.e.,
µi + µsi = Si, (9)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. Moreover, the measure µni of high-valuation agents engaged in a borrower-lender
match must equal the measure of low-valuation agents, i.e.,
µni = µsi + µni + µbi, (10)
for i ∈ {1, 2}. The remaining equations follow from the requirement that the inflow into an agent
type must equal the outflow. Consider, for example, the type b of high-valuation buyers. The
inflow into this type is F because of the new entrants. The outflow is the sum of κµb because some
high-valuation buyers revert to average valuation and exit the market, and
∑2
i=1 λµsiµb because
some high-valuation buyers meet sellers of assets 1 or 2 and buy. Therefore,
F = κµb +
2∑
i=1
λµsiµb. (11)
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In Appendix B we derive the remaining inflow-outflow equations and show that the resulting system
has a unique solution.
4.4 Optimization
Agents optimize over their consumption flow and risky-asset portfolio. We solve the optimization
problem in two steps: (i) take the portfolio decision as given and solve for optimal consumption, thus
computing an “interim” value function, and (ii) determine the portfolio decision that maximizes this
value function. We characterize the value function in Appendix C, and leave portfolio optimization
to Appendix E where we compute the full equilibrium. In this section we present an intuitive
characterization of the value function corresponding to agents’ equilibrium portfolio decisions, i.e.,
the life-cycles of Section 4.2.
An agent’s value function takes the form
−1
r
exp
[
−A (Wt + Vτ ) + r − β + A
2σ2e/2
r
]
,
where Wt is the investment in the riskless asset, and Vτ is a constant that depends on the agent’s
type and to which we refer as the agent’s “utility.” The set of utilities solves a system of nonlinear
equations. The equations, however, become linear and can be solved in closed form in an inter-
esting special case. This is when the coefficient of absolute risk aversion A goes to zero, holding
the parameters y, x, and x constant.19 Because these parameters measure the cost and hedging
benefit of bearing risk, risk considerations matter even in the limit. It is, however, only the risk
of the dividend process that matters, and not the risk associated to the matching process in the
search market. Agents are effectively risk-neutral relative to the latter, and this is what makes the
equations linear. From now on, we focus on the limit case because it captures the key economic
intuitions while also generating simpler equations.
The equations take a form which is standard in the search literature. This is that the flow
value rVτ of being type τ is derived from the flow benefits accruing to that type (dividends and
lending fees) plus the transitions to other types. For a high-valuation buyer b, for example, the
19Recall from Section 3 that these parameters are defined by y ≡ Aσ2/2, x ≡ Aρσσe, and x ≡ Aρσσe. Therefore,
when A goes to zero, the variances σ and σe must go to infinity. Note that the certainty equivalent C(ρ, z) is
unaffected when taking the limit because its dependence on A, σ, and σe is only through y, x, and x.
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equation is
rVb = −κVb +
2∑
i=1
λµsi(Vi − pi − Vb), (12)
because the flow benefits are zero and the transitions are (i) revert to average valuation at rate κ
and exit the market (utility zero and net utility −Vb), and (ii) meet a seller of asset i ∈ {1, 2} at
rate λµsi, buy at price pi, and become a lender i (utility Vi and net utility Vi − pi − Vb).
In Appendix D we derive the remaining equations. These must be solved together with the
equations for the price and the lending fee. The price is determined by bargaining between buyers
and sellers. There are two types of buyers, b and bi, and two types of sellers, si and si. Type b has
reservation value ∆b ≡ Vi − Vb because after buying asset i he becomes a lender with utility Vi.
Type bi has reservation value ∆bi ≡ −Vbi because after buying she delivers the asset and exits the
market. Likewise, the sellers’ reservation values are ∆si ≡ Vsi and ∆si ≡ Vsi − Vni. Because type b
receives a hedging benefit from holding the asset while type si does not, reservation values satisfy
∆b > ∆si. They also satisfy ∆bi > ∆si because type si receives a hedging benefit from holding a
short position while type bi does not. To complete the ranking, we assume that short-sellers are
the infra-marginal traders, both as sellers and as buyers, i.e.,
∆bi > ∆b > ∆si > ∆si. (13)
This assumption makes the analysis more transparent because it ensures that the marginal traders
are comparable across assets, even in equilibria where short-selling is concentrated on one asset.
In Section 4.5 we show that Equation (13) is satisfied under appropriate restrictions on exogenous
parameters.
We focus on simple equilibria of the bargaining game in which all buyers and sellers make
the same offer pi. This offer must be in [∆si,∆b] to ensure that all traders realize a non-negative
surplus. Given the buyers’ strategy, asking pi is optimal for a seller - a higher ask would preclude
trading while a lower ask would lower the transaction price. Likewise, given the sellers’ strategy,
bidding pi is optimal for a buyer. Obviously any pi ∈ [∆si,∆b] is an equilibrium. We do not select
among these, but instead treat the buyers’ “bargaining power” φ defined by
pi = φ∆si + (1− φ)∆b, (14)
as exogenous. The bargaining power φ is equal to the fraction of the overall surplus ∆b −∆si that
the marginal buyer b can extract.
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The lending fee is determined by bargaining between borrowers and lenders. We compute it in
Appendix D as a function of the surplus Σi associated to a borrower-lender match, and the fraction
θ of that surplus that a lender can extract.
4.5 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is characterized by
(i) Measures µτ for all agent types τ ∈ T .
(ii) Utilities Vτ for all agent types τ ∈ T .
(iii) Prices and lending fees (pi, wi) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
(iv) Short-selling decisions νi ∈ {0, ν} for i ∈ {1, 2}.
These variables are a solution to the following fixed-point problem. The measures are determined
from the nonlinear system of Equations (9)-(11) and (33)-(38), as a function of the short-selling
decisions. The utilities, prices, and lending fees are determined from the linear system of equations
(12) and (80)-(90), as a function of the measures and short-selling decisions. Finally, the short-
selling decisions are determined as a function of the utilities from
νi = ν ⇔ Σi ≥ 0, (15)
i.e., agents short-sell asset i if the surplus Σi associated to a borrower-lender match is positive.
A solution to the fixed-point problem is an equilibrium if it satisfies two additional requirements.
First, the conjectured portfolio decisions must be optimal, i.e., high- and low-valuation agents must
adopt the life-cycles of Section 4.2, and average-valuation agents (including arbitrageurs) must hold
no position. Second, the buyers’ and sellers’ reservation values must be ordered as in Equation (13).
We are interested in two types of equilibria: a symmetric one where low-valuation agents short-
sell both assets, i.e., ν1 = ν2 = ν, and an asymmetric one where short-selling is concentrated on
one asset only, say asset 1, i.e., ν1 = ν and ν2 = 0. Computing these equilibria can, in general,
be done only numerically. Fortunately, however, closed-form solutions can be derived when search
frictions are small, i.e., λ and ν are large.20 In the remainder of this section we focus on this case,
20More precisely, we assume that λ and ν go to ∞, holding the ratio n ≡ ν/λ constant. When taking this limit,
we will say that a variable Z is asymptotically equal to z1/λ + z2/ν, if Z = z1/λ + z2/(nλ) + o(1/λ).
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emphasizing the intuitions gained by the closed-form solutions. We complement our asymptotic
analysis with a numerical calibration in Section 6.
When search frictions are small, the measure of agents in the “short” side of a market goes
to zero. The short side in the repo market are the borrowers because they enter the market at a
flow rate, while the lenders are the asset-holders and constitute a stock. The short side in the spot
market depends on the comparison between the asset demand, generated by the high-valuation
agents, and the asset supply, generated by the issuers and the short-sellers. As in the Walrasian
case, we assume that demand exceeds supply, i.e.,
F
κ
> 2S +
F
κ
. (16)
Under this condition, the short side in the spot market are the sellers.
4.5.1 Symmetric Equilibrium
Proposition 2 Assume Equation (16),
x + κr+κ+gs x
1 + κr+κ+gs
> 2y > x, (17)
and φ, θ = 1, where gs is defined by Equation (60) of Appendix D. Then, for large λ and ν, there
exists a symmetric equilibrium in which prices, lending fees, and types’ measures are identical across
assets.
In the proof of Proposition 2 we determine the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium. We
confirm that the measures of sellers and borrowers, who are the short side in their respective
markets, go to zero, while the measures of buyers and lenders go to positive limits. In particular,
for each asset i ∈ {1, 2}, the measure of lenders converges to the asset supply S, and the measure
of buyers to a limit mb. On the other hand, the measure of sellers is asymptotically equal to gs/λ,
and that of borrowers to gbo/ν, for two constants gs and gbo. The asymptotic behavior of the price
and the lending fee is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 In the symmetric equilibrium of Proposition 2, the price of each asset i ∈ {1, 2} is
asymptotically equal to
pi =
δ + x− y
r
− κ
λmb
x
r
− φ(r + κ + 2gs)
λ(1− φ)mb
x
r
+
gbo
r + κ + κ gsr+κ+κ+gs + gbo
wi
r
, (18)
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and the lending fee is asymptotically equal to
wi = θ
(
r + κ + κ
gs
r + κ + κ + gs
+ gbo
)
Σi, (19)
where
Σi =
x− r+κ+κ+gsr+κ+gs (2y − x)
2ν(1− θ)S . (20)
The price is the sum of four terms. The first term, (δ + x − y)/r, is the limit to which the
price converges when search frictions go to zero. Not surprisingly, this limit is the Walrasian price
of Proposition 1. Recall that the Walrasian price is the PV of the high-valuation agents’ certainty
equivalent of one share. High-valuation agents bid the price up to their valuation because they are
the long side in the market.
The remaining terms in Equation (18) are adjustments to the Walrasian price due to search
frictions. The second term is a liquidity discount, arising because high-valuation agents incur a
search cost when needing to sell the asset. This cost reduces their valuation and lowers the asset
price. The liquidity discount decreases in the measure of buyers (mb in the limit) because this
reduces the time to sell the asset, and increases in the rate κ of reversion to average valuation
because this reduces the investment horizon. Interpreting the search cost as a transaction cost, the
liquidity discount is in the spirit of Amihud and Mendelson [1986].21
The third term is a discount arising because high-valuation agents have bargaining power in
the search market and can extract some surplus from the sellers. This “bargaining” discount is
present only when the buyers’ bargaining power φ is non-zero.
The last term is a specialness premium, arising because high-valuation agents can earn a fee by
lending the asset in the repo market. This fee is an additional cash flow derived from the asset and
raises its price. The specialness premium is the PV of the asset’s expected lending revenue, but is
smaller that the PV wi/r of a continuous stream of the lending fee. This is because lenders must
search for borrowers and cannot ensure that their asset is on loan continuously. In fact, the time to
meet a borrower does not converge to zero when search frictions become small. For small frictions,
the flow of borrowers who enter into the market are matched almost instantly with lenders. Because,
21Consistent with Amihud and Mendelson, the liquidity discount κx/(λmbr) is the PV of transaction costs incurred
by a sequence of marginal buyers. Indeed, a high-valuation investor (the marginal buyer) reverts to average valuation
at rate κ. He then incurs an opportunity cost x of holding the asset, since he does not realize the hedging benefit,
until he meets a new buyer at rate λmb.
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however, lenders are in positive measure, the meeting time from any given lender’s viewpoint is
finite.22
The lending fee arises because of the lenders’ bargaining power θ in the repo market, exactly as
in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen [2002]. When the bargaining power is non-zero, the lenders can
extract some of the short-selling surplus Σi from the borrowers. Of course, when search frictions
become small, lenders can be contacted almost instantly, and competition among them drives the
fee down to zero.
The short-selling surplus Σi increases in the hedging benefit x of the low-valuation agents. It
also increases in gs, which is the Poisson intensity at which sellers can be contacted in the limit.23
The easier the sellers are to contact, the more attractive a short-sale becomes to a low-valuation
agent because it is easier to buy the asset back.
4.5.2 Asymmetric Equilibrium
Proposition 4 Assume Equations (16), (17), φ = 1, θ = 0, 1, and ν/λ ∈ (n1, n2) for two positive
constants n1, n2. Then, for large λ and ν, there exists an asymmetric equilibrium where short-selling
is concentrated on asset 1.
Taken together, Propositions 2 and 4 imply that there is a parameter range for which a sym-
metric and an asymmetric equilibrium coexist. In the asymmetric equilibrium, low-valuation agents
short-sell only asset 1, declining any opportunities to borrow asset 2. This occurs because of search
externalities. The more agents short-sell asset 1, the greater the asset’s seller pool becomes. The
asset’s buyer pool also increases because of the short-sellers who need to buy the asset back. This
makes asset 1 easier to trade, attracting, in turn, more short-sellers.
While the general notion of search externalities is well-understood, its application to the on-the-
run phenomenon is subtle. Absent the short-sellers, search externalities would not operate. Indeed,
the only agents choosing between the two assets would be the high-valuation buyers. While these
agents value an asset with a larger buyer pool (because they eventually turn into sellers), prices
22Formally, the measure of borrowers is asymptotically equal to gbo/ν, and thus the Poisson intensity νµbo at which
borrowers can be contacted converges to gbo.
23The Poisson intensity at which sellers can be contacted is λµs, and converges to gs because the measure of sellers
is asymptotically equal to gs/λ. The surplus is increasing in gs because Equation (17) requires that 2y > x. This
inequality ensures that upon reverting to average valuation, a short-seller prefers to buy the asset back rather than
keeping the short position.
The surplus Σi is positive because of the left-hand-side inequality in Equation (17). In fact, this inequality is
stronger than Σi > 0 because it ensures that low-valuation agents are not only willing to short-sell, but are also the
infra-marginal, i.e., the more eager, sellers.
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would adjust so that in equilibrium agents hold both assets. Therefore, the assets would have a
common buyer pool, and be identical from a buyer’s viewpoint.
Search externalities would not operate even with short-sellers, if these were allowed to deliver
any asset and not necessarily the one they borrowed. Indeed, the assets would have a common buyer
pool, consisting of the high-valuation buyers and the short-sellers who need to deliver. Therefore,
both assets would be equally attractive to short-sell: equally easy to sell because of the common
buyer pool, and equally easy to deliver because one can be substituted for the other.
Summarizing, search externalities can operate only because of the combination of short-sellers
and the constraint that these can deliver only the asset they borrowed. This constraint “locks”
short-sellers into buying one asset, thus generating differences in the assets’ buyer pools. It also
implies that that the size of an asset’s seller pool matters: a short-seller finds it more valuable to
borrow an asset with a larger seller pool because that asset can be delivered more easily.
In the proof of Proposition 4, we determine the asymptotic behavior of the equilibrium. We
show that for each asset i, the measure of lenders converges to the asset supply S, and the measure
of buyers to a limit mˆbi such that mˆb1 > mˆb2. On the other hand, the measure of sellers is
asymptotically equal to gˆsi/λ, and that of borrowers to gˆbo/ν, for constants gˆs1 > gˆs2 and gˆbo. We
return to these constants in Section 4.5.3, where we compare the symmetric and the asymmetric
equilibrium. The asymptotic behavior of the price and the lending fee is in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 In the asymmetric equilibrium of Proposition 4, asset prices are asymptotically
equal to
p1 =
δ + x− y
r
− κ
λmˆb1
x
r
− φ
λ(1− φ)
[
r + κ + gˆs1
mˆb1
+
gˆs2
mˆb2
]
x
r
+
gˆbo
r + κ + κ gˆs1r+κ+κ+gˆs1 + gˆbo
w1
r
(21)
and
p2 =
δ + x− y
r
− κ
λmˆb2
x
r
− φ
λ(1− φ)
[
r + κ + gˆs2
mˆb2
+
gˆs1
mˆb1
]
x
r
. (22)
The lending fee for asset 1 is asymptotically equal to
w1 = θ
(
r + κ + κ
gˆs1
r + κ + κ + gˆs1
+ gˆbo
)
Σ1, (23)
where
Σ1 =
x− r+κ+κ+gˆs1r+κ+gˆs1 (2y − x)
ν(1− θ)S . (24)
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An immediate consequence of Proposition 5 is that the price of asset 1 exceeds that of asset
2. This is because of three effects working in the same direction. First, the liquidity discount is
smaller for asset 1 because this asset has a larger buyer pool, i.e., mˆb1 > mˆb2. Second, the bargaining
discount is smaller for asset 1 because the larger buyer pool implies more outside options for the
sellers.24 Finally, asset 1 carries a specialness premium because unlike asset 2, it can be lent to
short-sellers.
Our model rationalizes the apparent paradox that off-the-run bonds are generally viewed as
“scarce” and hard to locate, while at the same time being cheaper than on-the-run bonds. We
show that off-the-run bonds are indeed scarce from the viewpoint of short-sellers seeking to buy
and deliver them. At the same time, they are cheaper than on-the-run bonds because the marginal
buyers are the agents seeking to establish long positions. These agents value the superior liquidity
of the on-the-run bonds and the ability to lend the bonds in the repo market.
Since asset prices differ in the asymmetric equilibrium, a natural question is whether there
exists a profitable arbitrage. By construction, an arbitrage cannot exist in our model because it
would be eliminated by the group of arbitrageurs. The question is instead why arbitrageurs choose
to hold no position even though asset prices differ.
Since asset 1 is more expensive than asset 2, an arbitrageur could buy asset 2 and short asset
1. The arbitrageur would, however, have to pay the lending fee for asset 1. Therefore, the strategy
is unprofitable if
p1 − p2 < w1
r
, (25)
i.e., the price differential between the two assets does not exceed the PV of the lending fee.25 In
equilibrium, however, the lending fee affects not only the cost of the arbitrage, but also the benefit:
it raises the price differential through the specialness premium. To examine whether Equation (25)
is satisfied, we thus need to substitute the equilibrium values of p1 and p2 from Proposition 5:
(φr + κ)
λ(1− φ)
[
1
mˆb2
− 1
mˆb1
]
x
r
+
gˆbo
r + κ + κ gˆs1r+κ+κ+gˆs1 + gˆbo
w1
r
<
w1
r
.
The first term on the left-hand side reflects asset 1’s lower liquidity and bargaining discounts relative
to asset 2, and we refer to it as asset 1’s liquidity premium. By buying asset 2 and shorting asset
24This logic does not apply to buyers because the marginal buyers are the high-valuation agents who are not limited
to the seller pool of a specific asset.
25In the proof of Proposition 4 we show that the strategy is unprofitable under the weaker condition p1 − p2 <
w1/r+ξ, for some some transaction cost ξ of establishing the arbitrage position: because trading opportunities arrive
one at a time in a Poisson manner, it is not possible to set up the two legs of the position simultaneously, and this
generates a cost of being unhedged for some time period.
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1, an arbitrageur capitalizes on this premium. The arbitrageur also capitalizes on the specialness
premium, which is the second term on the left-hand side. Crucially, however, the specialness
premium is only a fraction of the cost w1/r of the arbitrage because lenders cannot ensure that
their asset is on loan continuously (as emphasized in Section 4.5.1). Thus, Equation (25) is satisfied
when the lending fee is large enough.26
An arbitrageur could follow the opposite strategy of buying asset 1 and shorting asset 2. In
the proof of Proposition 4 we show that this strategy is unprofitable if
gˆbo
r + κ gˆs1r+κ+gs1 + gˆbo
w1
r
≤ p1 − p2. (26)
The left-hand side is the arbitrageur’s fee income from lending asset 1 in the repo market. This
exceeds the specialness premium (included in p1 − p2) because the arbitrageur can hold asset 1
forever, thus being a better lender than a sequence of high-valuation agents. Because, however, the
arbitrageur loses on the liquidity premium (the remaining part of p1−p2), Equation (26) is satisfied
when the lending fee is small enough. In the proof of Proposition 4 we show that Equations (25)
and (26) are jointly satisfied when the ratio ν/λ of relative frictions in the spot and repo markets
is in some interval (n1, n2).27
4.5.3 Comparison of the Symmetric and the Asymmetric Equilibrium
We next compare the equilibria of Propositions 2 and 4.
Proposition 6 In the asymmetric equilibrium:
(i) There are more buyers and sellers of asset 1 than in the symmetric equilibrium.
(ii) There are fewer buyers and sellers of asset 2 than in the symmetric equilibrium.
26Our analysis has an interesting similarity to Krishnamurthy [2002], who assumes that p1−p2 = v+zw1/r, where
v is a “liquidity benefit” of on-the-run bonds, and z < 1 is the extent to which bond owners can exploit the specialness
premium. In our setting, v is the liquidity premium and z is determined by the lenders’ search times.
27Equations (25) and (26) ensure that arbitrage portfolios are suboptimal for arbitrageurs, i.e., average-valuation
agents with no initial position. They do not apply, however, to average-valuation agents with “inherited” positions.
Consider, for example, a low-valuation agent with a short position in asset 1, who reverts to average valuation. The
agent can unwind the short position by trading with a seller of asset 1, but might also accept to trade with a seller
of asset 2. This would hedge the short position, lowering the cost of waiting for a seller of asset 1.
In our analysis, we rule out such strategies by assuming that arbitrage portfolios can be held only by arbitrageurs.
This is partly for simplicity, to keep agents’ life-cycles manageable. One could also argue that many investors do not
engage in such strategies because of costs to managing multiple positions, settlement costs, etc. (These costs could
be smaller for sophisticated arbitrageurs.) Needless to say, it would be desirable to relax this assumption.
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(iii) The lending fee of asset 1 is higher than in the symmetric equilibrium.
(iv) The prices of the two assets straddle the symmetric-equilibrium price when φ = 0. For other
values of φ (e.g., 1/2), both prices can exceed the symmetric-equilibrium price.
(v) Social welfare is higher than in the symmetric equilibrium.
Since in the asymmetric equilibrium short-selling is concentrated on asset 1, there are more
sellers of this asset than in the symmetric equilibrium. There are also more buyers because of the
short-sellers who need to buy the asset back. Conversely, asset 2 attracts fewer buyers and sellers
than in the symmetric equilibrium.
The lending fee of asset 1 is higher than in the symmetric equilibrium because of two effects.
First, because there are more buyers and sellers of asset 1, a short-sale is easier to execute, and
the short-selling surplus is higher. Moreover, lenders of asset 1 are in better position to bargain for
this surplus because they do not have to compete with lenders of asset 2.
To explain the price results, we recall that prices differ from the Walrasian benchmark because
of a liquidity discount, a bargaining discount, and a specialness premium. In the asymmetric
equilibrium, asset 1’s liquidity discount is smaller than in the symmetric equilibrium because there
are more buyers. Moreover, asset 1’s specialness premium is higher because of the higher lending
fee. Conversely, asset 2’s liquidity discount is higher than in the symmetric equilibrium, and its
specialness premium is zero. Therefore, absent the bargaining discount, i.e., when the buyers’
bargaining power φ is zero, asset 1 trades at a higher price and asset 2 at a lower price relative to
the symmetric equilibrium.
Perhaps the most surprising result of Proposition 6 is that both assets can trade at a higher
price relative to the symmetric equilibrium. Thus, the bargaining discount can reverse the effects
of liquidity and specialness. To explain the intuition, we recall that short-sellers exit the seller pool
faster when the asset they have borrowed has a larger buyer pool. This occurs in the asymmetric
equilibrium because asset 1 has more buyers than either asset in the symmetric equilibrium. There-
fore, there are fewer short-sellers in the asymmetric equilibrium, and the aggregate seller pool can
be smaller. This can, in turn, worsen the buyers’ bargaining position and raise the prices of both
assets.
To measure social welfare, we add the utilities Vτ of all agents, discounting those of future
entrants at the interest rate r. From the Bellman equations of Section 4.4, an agent’s utility is
equal to the PV of the flow benefits derived over the agent’s lifetime. Therefore, social welfare is
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equal to the PV of the flow benefits derived by all agents. In the proof of Proposition 6 we show
that welfare depends on the equilibrium allocation through
2∑
i=1
[
µni(x + x− 2y)− µsix− µbi(2y − x)
]
. (27)
The first term inside the summation corresponds to the gains from trade between high- and low-
valuation agents, achieved through short-sales. The extent of short-sales is given by the measure
µni of low-valuation non-searchers. The last two terms correspond to inefficiencies arising because
some average-valuation agents hold positions that are no longer optimal. These agents are either
sellers si seeking to unwind a long position, or buyers bi seeking to unwind a short position.
When search frictions are small, the measure µsi converges to zero, while
∑2
i=1 µni converges to
the measure F/κ of low-valuation agents. Therefore, welfare depends on the equilibrium allocation
only through the measure
∑2
i=1 µbi of buyers seeking to unwind short positions. In the asymmetric
equilibrium these buyers can trade faster because asset 1 has more sellers than either asset in the
symmetric equilibrium. Therefore,
∑2
i=1 µbi is lower and social welfare higher.
5 Extensions
5.1 Different Supplies
In this section we consider the case where asset supplies differ. Without loss of generality, we take
asset 1 to be in larger supply, i.e., S1 > S2.
Proposition 7 Assume Equation (4). As λ and ν become large:
(i) An equilibrium where low-valuation agents short-sell both assets exists for a set of values of
S1 − S2 that converges to {0}.
(ii) An equilibrium where short-selling is concentrated on asset 1 exists for all values of S1 − S2.
(iii) An equilibrium where short-selling is concentrated on asset 2 exists for a set of values of
S1 − S2 that converges to [0, Sˆ] with Sˆ > 0.
(iv) Social welfare is higher when short-selling is concentrated on asset 1 rather than asset 2.
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Proposition 7 shows that asset supply is a powerful device in selecting among the equilibria
of Section 4. For small search frictions, the symmetric equilibrium becomes knife-edge, existing
only when asset supplies are very close. The intuition is the asset in larger supply (asset 1) has a
larger seller pool because it has a larger pool of lenders who can revert to average valuation. This
makes it more attractive to short-sellers because they can unwind a position more easily. When
search frictions are small, short-sellers can afford to wait for asset 1 in the repo market, declining
to borrow asset 2, and this eliminates the symmetric equilibrium.
The asymmetric equilibria are not knife-edge. In particular, short-selling can be concentrated
on the smaller-supply asset 2 even when supplies are not very close. Intuitively, while asset 2 has
a smaller pool of lenders who can revert to average valuation, it can have a larger overall seller
pool because of the short-sellers. This makes it more attractive to short-sell and reinforces the
equilibrium. Of course, short-sellers can compensate for the difference in supplies only when this
difference is not too large. Otherwise, short-selling can only be concentrated on asset 1. Asset 1’s
seller pool in this equilibrium is larger than asset 2’s in the equilibrium where asset 2 attracts the
short-sellers. Thus, when short-selling is concentrated on asset 1, short-sellers can unwind their
positions more easily and social welfare is higher.
Proposition 7 can reconcile our theory based on multiple equilibria with the empirical fact that
liquidity in the US Treasury market concentrates in the just-issued bond. Indeed, a commonly-held
view is that a bond’s effective supply decreases over time as the bond becomes “locked away” in
the portfolios of long-horizon investors (see Amihud and Mendelson [1991]). Our theory does not
capture this effect because it focuses on steady-states and assumes equal horizons for all high-
valuation investors. It suggests, however, that because off-the-run bonds are in smaller effective
supply, they are less likely to attract short-sellers and for that reason less liquid.
5.2 Market Integration
We next relax the constraint that short-sellers can deliver only the asset they borrowed. In the
Treasury market this could be achieved if on- and off-the-run bonds are standardized in terms of
their maturity dates. For example, a two-year bond could be designed to mature on exactly the
same date as a previously-issued five-year bond. The two bonds could then be made “fungible,”
assigned the same CUSIP number, and be identical for delivery purposes. Bennett et al. [2000]
propose specific measures to implement this outcome, arguing that it would enhance the liquidity
of the Treasury market.
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When short-sellers can deliver any asset, markets are effectively integrated as if there is a single
asset in supply 2S. In Proposition 8 we compare this outcome to the equilibria of Propositions 2
and 4.
Proposition 8 Suppose that there is a single asset in supply 2S. Then
(i) The asset price is higher than in the symmetric equilibrium.
(ii) The asset price is higher than the price of asset 2 in the asymmetric equilibrium. It can be
higher or lower than the price of asset 1 and the average price of the two assets.
(iii) Social welfare is higher than in the symmetric and asymmetric equilibria.
Under market integration, each asset has more buyers than in the symmetric and asymmetric
equilibria. Therefore, the liquidity and bargaining discounts are smaller. The specialness premium
tends to be larger because market integration increases the short-selling surplus (by facilitating
delivery), thus increasing the fee that lenders can extract. Offsetting this effect, is that lenders of
asset 1 in the asymmetric equilibrium are in better position to bargain for the surplus because they
do not have to compete with lenders of asset 2. This can generate the surprising result that the
price under market integration can be lower than the average price in the asymmetric equilibrium.
Social welfare is always higher, however, because short-sellers can deliver more easily.
An interesting implication of Proposition 8 is that while social welfare is always maximized
under market integration, government revenue can be maximized in the asymmetric equilibrium.
This suggests that in some circumstances, a revenue-maximizing Treasury might have no incentive
to relax the constraint that short-sellers can only deliver the asset they borrowed.
6 Calibration
In this section we perform a calibration exercise, and show that our model can generate significant
price effects even for short search times. For the calibration we extend the model to more than
two assets. This provides a more accurate description of the US Treasury market, where there is
one on-the-run and multiple off-the-run securities for each maturity range. With multiple assets
there is again an equilibrium where short-sellers concentrate in one asset, e.g., asset 1. To compute
this equilibrium for the purpose of calibration, we do not rely on the asymptotic closed-form
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solutions of Section 4. Instead, we use a simple numerical algorithm that solves the exact system
of equations and checks that arbitrage is unprofitable. Table 1 lists our chosen values for the
exogenous parameters, and Tables 2 and 3 list the calibration results.
We set the number of assets to I = 20, consistent with the fact that on-the-run bonds account
for about 5% of the Treasury market capitalization (Dupont and Sack [1999]). We assume that all
assets are in identical supply S. We normalize the total supply IS to one, without loss of generality:
Equations (7)-(11) and (35)-(39) show that if (S, F , F , 1/λ, 1/ν) are scaled by the same factor, the
meeting intensities of each investor type stay the same, and therefore prices and utilities do not
change.
As in the case of two assets, we assume that demand exceeds supply, i.e., F/κ > IS + F/κ.
We select (F , F ) to make this an approximate equality; otherwise for small frictions, search times
for sellers would be much shorter than for buyers. We use the second degree of freedom in (F , F )
to match the level of short-selling activity. Namely, in our calibration the amount of ongoing
repo agreements for asset 1 is about seven times the asset’s issue size (Table 2), which is within
reasonable range.28
The expected investment horizons 1/κ and 1/κ are chosen to match turnover. Sundaresan
[2002] and Strebulaev [2002] report that on-the-run bonds trade about ten times more than their
off-the-run counterparts. Since the entire stock of Treasury securities turns over in less than three
weeks (Dupont and Sack [1999]), on-the-run bonds turn over in about two-thirds of a day, and
off-the-run bonds in about 125 days.29 In our model the turnover of off-the-run bonds is generated
by high-valuation investors. We let 1/κ = 0.5 years, i.e., 125 trading days, implying a turnover time
of about the same (Table 2). The turnover of on-the-run bonds is generated mainly by short-sellers.
We let 1/κ = 0.025 years, i.e., about six trading days. Such a short horizon could be reasonable
for dealers in corporate bonds or mortgage-backed securities who have transitory needs to hedge
inventory. For our chosen value of κ, asset 1 turns over in 0.88 days, and its volume relative to
the aggregate of the other assets is 7.5 (Table 2).30 This is lower than the actual value of ten,
28For example, on February 2, 2005, primary dealers reported asset loans of about $2 trillion (New York Fed
website, www.ny.frb.org/markets/gsds/search.cfm). Since the Treasury market is worth about $4 trillion, of
which 5% are on-the-run bonds, the amount of repo agreements exceeds the market value of on-the-run bonds by
about 2/(4 × 5%) = 10. We select a number below ten to account for repo activity in off-the-run bonds. A higher
number would strengthen our results because the lending fee would increase.
29Suppose, for example, that the average Treasury security turns over in twelve trading days. Since on-the-run bonds
account for about 5% of market capitalization and 10/11 of trading volume, they turn over in 5%×12/(10/11) = 0.66
days, while off-the-run bonds turn over in 95%× 12/(1/11) = 125.4 days.
30The six-day expected horizon of short-sellers is approximately equal to the turnover time of the asset supply that
they generate (F/κ). This supply is about seven times the issue size S, and turns over seven times more slowly.
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Table 1: Parameter Values used in the Numerical Example.
Parameters Value
Number of assets I 20
Supply of each asset S 0.05
Flow of high-valuation investors F 2.7
Flow of low-valuation investors F 13.6
Switching intensity of high-valuation investors κ 2
Switching intensity of low-valuation investors κ 40
Contact intensity in spot market λ 106
Contact intensity in repo market ν 7.5× 104
Bargaining power of a buyer φ 0.5
Bargaining power of a lender θ 0.5
Riskless rate r 4%
Dividend rate δ 1
Hedging benefit of high-valuation investors x 0.4
Cost of risk bearing y 0.5
but one could argue that short-selling is not the only factor driving the large relative volume of
on-the-run bonds. Furthermore, raising the relative volume by increasing κ would strengthen our
results because the lending fee would increase.
The parameters λ and ν are chosen to generate short search times, as reported in Table 2.
Assuming ten trading hours per day,31 most search times are in the order of a few hours or less,
significantly smaller than the standard settlement time. It takes 12 minutes to sell the “on-the-run”
asset 1 and 2.7 hours to buy it. Each “off-the-run” asset i ∈ {2, .., I} can be sold in 2.8 hours and
bought in 2.2 days. The time to buy might seem long, but is not unreasonable given that off-the-
run bonds are often viewed as hard to locate. Furthermore, in our model all off-the-run assets
are perfect substitutes for their buyers, who are the high-valuation agents. Therefore, a buyer’s
effective search time does not exceed 2.2/(I−1) = 0.11 days. Finally, it takes 42 minutes to borrow
asset 1 in the repo market and 8.7 hours to lend it. The time to lend the on-the-run asset might
seem long but could be interpreted as an average across asset owners, some of whom do not engage
in asset lending in practice.
The parameters φ and θ are set to 0.5 so that all agents are symmetric. The riskless rate r is set
to 4%, consistent with Ibbotson [2004]’s average T-bill rate of 3.8% during the period 1926-2002.
Given that prices and lending fees are linear in (δ, x, x, y), we let δ = 1 and report relative prices
31US Treasury securities are traded round the clock in New York, London, and Tokyo. However, Fleming [1997]
reports that 94% of the trading takes place in New York from 7:30am to 5:30pm.
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Table 2: Numerical Results: Search Times and Turnover.
Variable Value
Average time to sell asset 1 1/(λµb1) 0.02 days
Average time to buy asset 1 1/(λµs1) 0.27 days
Average time to sell asset i ∈ {2, .., I} 1/(λµbi) 0.28 days
Average time to buy asset i ∈ {2, .., I} 1/(λµsi) 2.20 days
Average time to borrow asset 1 1/(λµ1) 0.07 days
Average time to lend asset 1 1/(λµbo) 0.87 days
Time to turn over stock of asset 1 S/(λµb1µs1) 0.88 days
Time to turn over stock of asset i ∈ {2, .., I} S/(λµbiµsi) 125.28 days
Volume of asset 1 vs. aggregate of assets i ∈ {2, .., I} (λµb1µs1)/((I − 1)λµbiµsi) 7.50
Repo agreements for asset 1 relative to issue size µn1/S 7.03
(e.g., δ/p, w/p). The parameters x and y are selected based on assets’ risk premia, measured by the
difference δ/pi − r between expected returns and the riskless rate. We assume that x < y, so that
the Walrasian price (δ + x− y)/r incorporates a positive premium. We also assume that y < δ, so
that risk premia do not result in negative prices: the lowest possible price is (δ−y)/r, the PV of the
average-valuation agents’ certainty equivalent. Our chosen values of x and y generate risk premia
of about 2-2.5%, which are within reasonable range for government bonds. (For example, Ibbotson
[2004] reports that long-term Treasuries returned 1.9% per year above bills during the period 1926-
2002.32) To select x, we note that Equation (5) suggests the restriction x ≤ 4y − x = 1.6, because
otherwise low-valuation agents could prefer to short more than one share. Moreover, our numerical
calculations indicate that x must exceed 0.97, so that the lending fee is large enough to preclude
arbitrage. We therefore assume 0.97 ≤ x ≤ 1.6, and report results for the two extreme values.
Table 3 reports the prices and lending fees. When x is equal to its lowest value of 0.97, the
effects are quite small: assets’ expected returns differ by 4bp, and specialness is 3bp. When,
however, x is equal to its highest value of 1.6, the effects are large and consistent with empirical
findings. In particular, the 51bp difference in expected returns is consistent with Warga [1992], who
reports that on-the-run portfolios return 55bp below matched off-the-run portfolios.33 Moreover,
32Of course, this is only suggestive since in our model risk arises because of asset payoffs and not interest rates.
33Some studies find smaller effects. For example, Goldreich et al. [2002] report that on-the-run bonds yield 1.5bp
below off-the-run bonds, and Fleming [2003] reports 5.6bp. These papers, however, focus on bonds with a long time
to maturity, for which the three-month convenience yield of being on-the-run has only a small effect on the yield
to maturity. Warga [1992] compares the returns of on- and off-the-run bond portfolios rather than their yields to
maturity. This isolates the on-the-run convenience yield in exactly the same way as in this paper. Amihud and
Mendelson [1991] compare yields to maturity, but can isolate the convenience yield because they focus on securities
with very short times to maturity. They find that Treasury bills maturing in less than six months yield 38bp below
comparable Treasury notes.
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Table 3: Numerical Results: Prices and Lending Fees.
Variable x = 0.97 x = 1.6
Expected return of asset 1 δ/p1 6.48% 6.02%
Expected return of asset i ∈ {2, .., I} δ/pi 6.52% 6.53%
Spread δ/pi − δ/p1 4bp 51bp
Lending fee w1/p1 3bp 35bp
the lending fee of 35bp is consistent with Duffie [1996], who reports a specialness difference of 40bp
between on- and off-the-run bonds.34
The large price effects are in spite of the short search times. The transaction costs implicit in
these times are, in fact, very small. For example, the cost incurred by a high-valuation buyer is
not to receive the hedging benefit x while searching. With a search time not exceeding 0.11 days,
i.e., 0.11/250 of a year, the search cost is a fraction x× (0.11/250)× (1/6.53%) = 1.1× 10−5 of the
price, i.e., 0.11 cents per $100 transaction value. Likewise, the search cost of a low-valuation agent
seeking to borrow asset 1 in the repo market is not to receive the hedging benefit x. When x is
equal to its highest value of 1.6, the cost is a fraction x×(0.07/250)×(1/6.53%) = 2.9×10−5 of the
price, i.e., 0.29 cents per $100 transaction value. Such costs are smaller than the average bid-ask
spread in the Treasury market, which is 1.1 cent (Dupont and Sack [1999]). While this raises the
question of what drives the bid-ask spread, it also shows that the large price effects in our model
are driven by very small transaction costs.
Small transaction costs imply that most of the return spread is due to the specialness premium.
Generalizing the decomposition in Section 4, we can show that when x = 1.6 the specialness
premium accounts for 99% of the spread while the liquidity premium for only 1%. Of course, this
does not mean that liquidity does not matter; it rather means that liquidity can have large effects
through specialness.
34The expected return spread δ/pi−δ/p1 in Table 3 is greater than the lending fee w1/p1. This suggests an arbitrage
strategy of shorting $1 of asset 1, paying the lending fee, and buying $1 of asset 2. The payoff of this strategy is risky,
however, because the assets are held in different quantities. Adjusting for risk amounts to calculating the marginal
utility flow (δ − y)/pi − (δ − y)/p1 − w1/p1 that an arbitrageur would derive, which turns out to be negative.
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7 Conclusion
This paper proposes a search-based theory of the on-the-run phenomenon. We take the view
that liquidity and specialness are not independent explanations of this phenomenon, but can be
explained simultaneously by short-selling activity. Short-sellers in our model can endogenously
concentrate in one of two identical assets, because of search externalities and the constraint that
they must deliver the asset they borrowed. That asset enjoys both greater liquidity, measured by
search times, and a higher lending fee (“specialness”). Moreover, liquidity and specialness translate
into price premia which are consistent with no-arbitrage. We derive closed-form solutions in the
realistic case of small frictions, and show that a calibration can generate effects of the observed
magnitude. Our model can shed light on additional aspects of the on-the-run phenomenon, such
as the effects of issue size and market integration, and the apparent puzzle that off-the-run bonds
are cheap yet “scarce.”
While our analysis is motivated from the government-bond market, some lessons can be more
general. Perhaps the main lesson concerns the law of one price - a fundamental tenet of Finance.
We show that this law can be violated in a significant manner in a model where all agents are
rational but the trading mechanism is not Walrasian. Our search-based trading mechanism is of
course an idealization, but it captures the bilateral nature of trading in over-the-counter markets.
Furthermore, the search times that are needed to generate significant price differentials are small,
in the order of a few hours. For such times, it is unclear whether the search framework is a
worse description of over-the-counter markets than a Walrasian auction, which assumes multilateral
trading.
31
A Walrasian Equilibrium
In this section we prove Proposition 1. An agent maximizes his intertemporal utility (2) subject to
the budget constraint
dWt =
[
rWt − ct +
2∑
i=1
(δ − rpi)zit
]
dt +
[
σ
2∑
i=1
zit + ρtσe
]
dBt + σe
√
1− ρ2tdZt
and the transversality condition
lim
T→∞
E [exp(−AWT − βT )] = 0,
where Wt is the wealth, zit the number of shares invested in asset i ∈ {1, 2}, and A ≡ ra. The
agent’s controls are the consumption c ∈ R and the investments z1, z2 ∈ Z. Obviously, if p1 = p2
the agent can achieve infinite utility by demanding an infinite amount of assets, contradicting
equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium p1 and p2 must be equal. Denoting their common value by p,
and the aggregate investment in the risky assets by z ≡ z1+ z2, we can write the budget constraint
as
dWt = [rWt − ct + (δ − rp)zt] dt + [σzt + ρtσe] dBt + σe
√
1− ρ2tdZt.
The agent’s value function J(Wt, ρt) satisfies the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
0 = sup
(c,z)∈R×Z
{
− exp(−αc) +D(c,z)J(W,ρ)− βJ(W,ρ)
}
, (28)
where
D(c,z)J(W,ρ) ≡ JW (W,ρ) [rW − c + (δ − rp)z] + 12JWW (W,ρ)
[
σ2z2 + 2ρσσez + σ2e
]
+κ(ρ) [J(W, 0)− J(W,ρ)] ,
and where the transition intensity κ(ρ) is equal to κ for ρ = ρ, and κ for ρ = ρ. We guess that
J(W,ρ) takes the form
J(W,ρ) = −1
r
exp
[
−A[W + V (ρ)] + r − β +
A2σ2e
2
r
]
,
32
for some function V (ρ). Replacing into Equation (28), we find that the optimal consumption is
c(ρ) = r[W + V (ρ)]− r − β +
A2σ2e
2
A
and the optimal investment satisfies
z(ρ) ∈ argmaxz∈Z{C(ρ, z)− rpz} ≡ Z(ρ)
for the incremental certainty equivalent C(ρ, z) introduced in Section 3. Plugging c(ρ) back into
Equation (28), we find that Equation (28) is satisfied iff
0 = −rV (ρ) + max
z∈Z
{C(ρ, z)− rpz}+ κ(ρ)1− e
−A(V (0)−V (ρ))
A
. (29)
Equation (29) implies that V (0) = maxz{C(ρ, z)−rpz}/r. Moreover, given V (0), the equations for
V (ρ) and V (ρ) are in only one unknown, and it is easy to check that they have a unique solution.
We next determine the equilibrium value of p. Because each type-ρ agent holds a position
z(ρ) ∈ Z(ρ), the average position zm(ρ) of these agents is in the convex hull of Z(ρ). Market
clearing requires that zm(0) = 0 because average-valuation agents in infinite measure. It also
requires that
F
κ
zm(ρ) +
F
κ
zm(ρ) =
2∑
i=1
Si. (30)
Because the function z → C(ρ, z) − rpz is strictly concave, the set Z(ρ) consists of either one or
two elements. If there exists a z such that
C(ρ, z)− rpz > max {C(ρ, z + 1)− rp(z + 1), C(ρ, z − 1)− rp(z − 1)} , (31)
then this z is unique and Z(ρ) = {z}. Otherwise, there exists a unique z such that
C(ρ, z)− rpz = C(ρ, z + 1)− rp(z + 1), (32)
and Z(ρ) = {z, z+1}. Using Equation (5) and the first-order conditions (31) and (32), it is easy to
check that for p = (d+x−y)/r, Z(ρ) = {0, 1}, Z(ρ) = {−1}, and Z(0) = {0}. Equation (30) follows
then from (4), implying that p = (δ + x− y)/r is an equilibrium price. It is the unique equilibrium
price because if p > (δ + x− y)/r then no agent would choose z > 0, and if p < (δ + x− y)/r then
high-valuation agents would choose z ≥ 1, while other agents would choose at least as much as for
p = (δ + x− y)/r.
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B Demographics
B.1 Inflow-Outflow Equations
The inflows and outflows for each agent type are as follows:
Lenders i: The inflow is the sum of λµbµsi because some high-valuation buyers meet sellers, and a
flow fi from the high-valuation non-searchers. The outflow is the sum of κµi because some lenders
switch to average valuation and become sellers, and νiµboµi because some lenders meet borrowers
and become high-valuation non-searchers. Thus,
λµbµsi + fi = κµi + νiµboµi. (33)
High-valuation non-searchers ni: The inflow is νiµboµi from the lenders. The outflow is the sum
of fi, and κµni because some high-valuation non-searchers revert to average valuation and either
become sellers (flow κµsi) or seize the collateral and exit the market (flow κ(µni + µbi)). Thus,
νiµboµi = fi + κµni. (34)
Sellers si: The inflow is the sum of κµi from the lenders, and κµsi from the high-valuation non-
searchers. The outflow is λµbiµsi because some sellers meet buyers and exit the market. Thus,
κµi + κµsi = λµbiµsi. (35)
Borrowers bo: The inflow is the sum of F because of the new entrants, and
∑2
i=1 κ(µsi + µni)
because of the low-valuation sellers and non-searchers who are called to deliver the asset. The
outflow is the sum of κµbo because some borrowers revert to average valuation and exit the market,
and
∑2
i=1 νiµboµi because some borrowers meet lenders and become low-valuation sellers. Thus,
F +
2∑
i=1
κ(µsi + µni) = κµbo +
2∑
i=1
νiµboµi. (36)
Low-valuation sellers si: The inflow is νiµboµi from the borrowers. The outflow is the sum of
κµsi because some low-valuation sellers are called to deliver the asset and become borrowers, κµsi
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because some low-valuation sellers revert to average valuation and exit the market, and λµbiµsi
because some low-valuation sellers meet buyers and become low-valuation non-searchers. Thus,
νiµboµi = κµsi + κµsi + λµbiµsi. (37)
Low-valuation non-searchers ni: The inflow is λµbiµsi from the low-valuation sellers. The outflow
is the sum of κµni because some low-valuation non-searchers are called to deliver the asset and
become borrowers, and κµni because some low-valuation non-searchers revert to average valuation
and become buyers. Thus,
λµbiµsi = κµni + κµni. (38)
Buyers bi: The inflow is κµni from the high-valuation non-searchers. The outflow is the sum of
κµbi because some buyers are called to deliver the asset and exit the market, and λµbiµsi because
some buyers meet sellers and exit the market. Thus,
κµni = κµbi + λµbiµsi. (39)
We consider the system formed by the accounting equations (7) and (8), the market-clearing
equations (9) and (10), and the inflow-outflow equations (11) and (35)-(39). The total number of
equations is 18 (because some are for each asset), and the 18 unknowns are the measures of the 14
agent types and {µbi, µsi}i∈{1,2}. A solution to the system satisfies Equations (33) and (34), which
is why we do not include them into the system. Indeed, adding Equations (37)-(39), and using
Equation (10), we find
νiµboµi = κµsi + κµni + λµbiµsi.
Therefore, Equation (34) holds with
fi = κµsi + λµbiµsi.
For this value of fi, Equation (33) becomes
λµbiµsi + κµsi = κµi + νiµboµi,
and is redundant because it can be derived by adding Equations (35) and (37).
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To solve the system, we reduce it to a simpler one in the six unknowns µbo, µb, and {µbi, µsi}i∈{1,2}.
Adding Equations (37) and (38), we find
µsi + µni =
νiµboµi
κ + κ
. (40)
Plugging into equation (36), and using Equation (9), we find
F = κµbo +
κ
κ + κ
2∑
i=1
νiµbo(S − µsi). (41)
Equations (37) and (9) imply that
µsi =
νiµbo(S − µsi)
κ + κ + λµbi
. (42)
Equation (38) implies that
µni =
λµsiµbi
κ + κ
(43)
and Equation (39) implies that
µbi =
κµni
κ + λµsi
. (44)
Combining these equations to compute µbi, and using Equation (7), we find
µbi = µb +
κλµbiνiµbo(S − µsi)
(κ + κ)(κ + κ + λµbi)(κ + λµsi)
. (45)
Noting that µi + µsi = S − µsi, we can use Equation (35) to compute µsi:
µsi =
κS
κ + λµbi
. (46)
Adding Equations (42) and (46), and using Equation (8), we find
µsi =
κS
κ + λµbi
+
νiµbo(S − µsi)
κ + κ + λµbi
. (47)
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The new system consists of Equations (11), (41), (45), and (47). These are six equations
(because some are for each asset), and the six unknowns are µbo, µb, and {µbi, µsi}i∈{1,2}. Once
this system is solved, the other measures can be computed as follows: µsi from (42), µni from (43),
µbi from (44), µsi from (46), µi from (9), and µni from (10).
To cover the case where search frictions are small, we make the change of variables ε ≡ 1/λ,
n ≡ ν/λ, αi ≡ νi/ν, γsi ≡ λµsi, and γbo ≡ νµbo. Under the new variables, Equations (11), (41),
(45), and (47) become
F = κµb +
2∑
i=1
µbγsi, (48)
F =
εκγbo
n
+
κ
κ + κ
2∑
i=1
αiγbo(S − εγsi), (49)
µbi = µb +
κµbiαiγbo(S − εγsi)
(κ + κ) [ε(κ + κ) + µbi] (κ + γsi)
, (50)
γsi =
κS
εκ + µbi
+
αiγbo(S − εγsi)
ε(κ + κ) + µbi
, (51)
respectively.
B.2 Existence and Uniqueness
We next show that the system of Equations (48)-(51) has a unique symmetric solution when α1 =
α2 = 1 (the “symmetric” case), and a unique solution when α1 = 1 and α2 = 0 (the “asymmetric”
case). Using Equation (50) to eliminate γbo in Equation (51), we find
γsi =
κS
εκ + µbi
+ (µbi − µb)
(κ + κ)(κ + γsi)
κµbi
.
Multiplying by µbi, and setting i = 1, we find
γs1µb =
κSµb1
εκ + µb1
+ (µb1 − µb)
κ
κ
(κ + κ + γs1). (52)
In the rest of the proof, we use Equations (48), (49), (50) for i ∈ {1, 2}, and (51) for i = 2, to
determine µb and µb1 as functions of γs1 ∈ (0, S/ε). We then plug these functions into Equation
(52), and show that the resulting equation in the single unknown γs1 has a unique solution.
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We first solve for µb. In the asymmetric case, Equation (50) implies that µb2 = µb, Equation
(51) implies that γs2 = κS/(εκ + µb), and Equation (48) implies that
F = κµb + µb
(
γs1 +
κS
εκ + µb
)
. (53)
The RHS of Equation (53) is (strictly) increasing in µb ∈ (0,∞), is equal to zero for µb = 0, and
goes to ∞ for µb →∞. Therefore, Equation (53) has a unique solution µb ∈ (0,∞). This solution
is decreasing in γs1 because the RHS is increasing in γs1. In the symmetric case, Equation (48)
implies that µb = F/(κ + 2γs1). This solution is again decreasing in γs1.
We next solve for µb1. Equation (49) implies that
γbo =
F
εκ
n +
κ
κ+κ
∑2
i=1 αi(S − εγsi)
=
F
εκ
n +
κ
κ+κ(1 + α2)(S − εγs1)
,
where the second step follows because in the symmetric case γs2 = γs1 and in the asymmetric case
α2 = 0. Plugging into Equation (50), setting i = 1, and dividing by µb1, we find
1 =
µb
µb1
+
(S − εγs1)nF
[ε(κ + κ) + µb1] (κ + γs1) [ε(κ + κ) + n(1 + α2)(S − εγs1)] . (54)
The RHS of Equation (54) is decreasing in µb1 ∈ (0,∞), goes to∞ for µb1 → 0, and goes to zero for
µb1 →∞. Therefore, Equation (53) has a unique solution µb1 ∈ (0,∞). This solution is decreasing
in γs1 because the RHS is decreasing in γs1 and increasing in µb (which is decreasing in γs1).
We next substitute µb and µb1 into Equation (52), and treat it as an equation in the single
unknown γs1. To show uniqueness, we will show that the LHS is increasing in γs1 and the RHS is
decreasing. In the symmetric case, the LHS is equal to
γs1µb =
γs1F
κ + 2γs1
,
and is increasing. In the asymmetric case, Equation (53) implies that the LHS is equal to
γs1µb = F − κµb −
κSµb
εκ + µb
,
and is increasing because µb is decreasing in γs1. The first term in the RHS is increasing in µb1,
and thus decreasing in γs1. To show that the second term is also decreasing, we multiply Equation
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(54) by µb1(κ + κ + γs1):
(µb1 − µb)(κ + κ + γs1) =
µb1(κ + κ + γs1)(S − εγs1)nF
[ε(κ + κ) + µb1] (κ + γs1) [ε(κ + κ) + n(1 + α2)(S − εγs1)] .
The RHS of this equation is decreasing in γs1 because it is decreasing in γs1 and increasing in µb1
(which is decreasing in γs1). Therefore, the second term in the RHS of Equation (52) is decreasing
in γs1.
To show existence, we note that for γs1 = 0, the LHS of Equation (52) is equal to zero, while
the RHS is positive. Moreover, for γs1 = S/ε, the LHS is equal to Sµb/ε, while the RHS is equal to
κSµb
εκ + µb
<
Sµb
ε
because µb1 = µb. Therefore, there exists a solution γs1 ∈ (0, S/ε).
B.3 Small Search Frictions
The case of small search frictions corresponds to small ε. Thus, the solution in this case is close
to that for ε = 0 provided that continuity holds. Our proof so far covers the case ε = 0, except
for existence. We next show that Equation (16) ensures existence for ε = 0. We also compute the
solution in closed form and show continuity.
To emphasize that ε = 0 is a limit case, we use m and g instead of µ and γ. Equations (48)-(51)
become
F = κmb +
2∑
i=1
mbgsi, (55)
F =
κ
κ + κ
2∑
i=1
αigboS, (56)
mbi = mb +
καigboS
(κ + κ)(κ + gsi)
, (57)
gsi =
κS
mbi
+
αiγboS
mbi
. (58)
We first solve the system of (55)-(58) in the symmetric case (α1 = α2 = 1), suppressing the asset
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subscript because of symmetry. Equation (56) implies that
gbo =
(κ + κ)F
2κS
, (59)
Equation (58) implies that
gs =
κS + κ+κ2κ F
mb
, (60)
and Equation (55) implies that
mb =
F
κ + 2gs
. (61)
Substituting gbo, gs, and mb from Equations (59)-(61) into Equation (57), we find that mb solves
the equation
1 =
F
κmb + 2κS +
κ+κ
κ F
+
F
2κmb + 2κS +
κ+κ
κ F
. (62)
This equation has a positive solution because of Equation (16).
We next consider the asymmetric case (α1 = 1, α2 = 0), and use mˆ and gˆ instead of m and g.
Equation (57) implies that mˆb2 = mˆb, Equation (58) implies that
gˆs2 =
κS
mˆb
, (63)
Equation (56) implies that
gˆbo =
(κ + κ)F
κS
, (64)
Equation (58) implies that
gˆs1 =
κS + κ+κκ F
mˆb1
, (65)
and Equation (55) implies that
mˆb =
F − κS
κ + gˆs1
. (66)
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Substituting gˆbo, gˆs1, and mˆb from Equations (64)-(66) into Equation (57), we find
mˆb1 =
F
κ
− 2S − F
κ
, (67)
which is positive because of Equation (16).
To show continuity at ε = 0, we write Equation (52) as
γs1µb −
κSµb1
εκ + µb1
− (µb1 − µb)
κ
κ
(κ + κ + γs1) = 0,
and denote by R(γs1, ε) the RHS (treating µb and µb1 as functions of (γs1, ε)). Because µb, µb1 > 0
for (γs1, ε) = (gs1, 0) (symmetric case) and (γs1, ε) = (gˆs1, 0) (asymmetric case), the functions µb
and µb1 are continuously differentiable around that point, and so is the function R(γs1, ε). Moreover,
our uniqueness proof shows that the derivative of R(γs1, ε) w.r.t. γs1 is positive. Therefore, the
Implicit Function Theorem ensures that for small ε, Equation (52) has a continuous solution γs1(ε).
Because of uniqueness, this solution coincides with the one that we have identified.
C Optimization
This appendix studies the stochastic control problem faced by an individual investor with CARA
utility, in the search equilibrium of Section 4. We define the investor’s problem, provide Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations as well as an optimality verification argument along the lines of
Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen [2004b] and Wang [2004]. In the last part, we show that the non-
linear HJB equations admit a linear approximation when the coefficient of constant risk aversion
is close to zero.
C.1 Investor’s Problem
We fix probability space (Ω,F ,P), as well as a filtration {Ft, t ≥ 0} satisfying the usual conditions
(see Protter [1990]). An investor (low-valuation, high-valuation, or arbitrageur) can be of either one
of finitely many types that we denote by τ ∈ T . The set T of type is the product of feasible porfolio
holdings and of income-dividend correlations. The arrival times of trading counterparties and of
changes of income-dividend correlations are counted by some adapted counting process Nt ∈ NK
with constant intensity γ ∈ RK+ . An investor with initial type τ0 and initial wealth W0 chooses
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a predictable T -valued type process τt and an adapted consumption and wealth process (ct,Wt)
subject to the following feasibility conditions. First, the type τt must remain constant during the
inter-arrival times of the counting process Nt. Second, when the investor is in state τ ∈ T and
when the process Nt(k) jumps, the investor can choose among transitions τ ′ ∈ T ′(τ, k) ⊆ T . For
example, when a buyer b meets a seller of asset i, he can either stay a buyer or make a transition
to the lender type i. The investor’s wealth process evolves according to the SDE
dWt = (rWt + m(τt)− ct) dt +
√
σ(τt)2 + σ2e dB˜t +
K∑
k=1
P (τt−, τt) dNt(k),
where B˜t is some adapted standard Brownian motion and, for all (τ, τ ′) ∈ T 2, P (τ, τ ′) is the payoff
of making a transition from type τ to type τ ′. For example, the payoff of making a transition from
type b to type i is P (b, i) = −pi. In addition, the wealth process must satisfy
lim
T→∞
E [exp(−βT − rαWT )] = 0 (68)
E
(∫ T
0
exp(−zWt) dt
)
< ∞, (69)
for all T ≥ 0 and z ∈ {rα, 2rα}. These conditions will be satisfied by our candidate optimal control
and allow us to complete the standard optimality verification argument. The investor problem is
to choose admissible type, wealth, and consumption processes in order to maximize intertemporal
utility
−E
[∫ ∞
0
exp(−βt− αct) dt
]
.
C.2 Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Equations
We guess an optimal control by seeking a value function J : R × T → R solving the following
system of Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equations (HJB)
0 = sup
{
− exp(−α c(τ))+D(c,τ ′)J(W, τ)− βJ(W, τ)}, (70)
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for all τ ∈ T , with respect to policy functions c : T → R and τ ′ : T × {1, . . . ,K} → T , subject to
τ ′(τ, k) ∈ T ′(τ, k), and where
D(c,τ ′)J(W, τ) ≡ JW (W, τ)
(
rW − c(τ) + m(τ))+ 1
2
(
σ(τ)2 + σ2e
)
JWW (W, τ)
+
K∑
k=1
γ(k)
(
J
(
W + P (τ, τ ′(τ, k)), τ ′(τ, k)
)− J(W, τ)). (71)
We guess that there exists a solution of the form
J(W, τ) = −1
r
exp
(
−A(W + V (τ)) + r − β + A
2σ2e/2
r
)
, (72)
where A ≡ rα. Substituting our guess in (70) and maximizing with respect to consumption, we
find that there exists a solution of the form (72) if an only if V ∈ RT solves
0 = −rV (τ) + m(τ)− A
2
σ(τ)2 +
K∑
k=1
γ(k) max
τ ′(τ,k)∈T ′(τ,k)
1− e−A
(
V (τ ′(τ,k))−V (τ)+P (τ,τ ′(τ,k))
)
A
,(73)
for all τ ∈ T . The consumption maximizing (70) given V (τ) is
c(τ) = r(W + V (τ))− r − β + A
2σ2e/2
A
. (74)
C.3 Optimality Verification
In this section we outline an optimality verification argument that closely follows Duffie, Gaˆrleanu
and Pedersen [2004b] and Wang [2004]. Let’s suppose that some V solves the system (73) and that
the maximum is achieved by some policy function τ ′( · , · ). We verify that the investor’s problem is
solved by the type process τ∗t that is generated recursively by the policy function τ ′( · , · ), together
with the consumption and wealth processes
c∗t = r(Wt + V (τ
∗
t ))−
r − β + A2σ2e/2
A
dW ∗t =
(
−rV (τ∗t ) +
r − β + A2σ2e/2
A
+ m(τ∗t )
)
dt +
√
σ(τ∗t ) + σ2edB˜t +
K∑
k=1
γ(k)P (τ∗t−, τ
∗
t ) dNt(k).
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The type process is feasible by construction. We only need to check conditions (68) and (69).
Condition (69) holds because, for all z ∈ R, the process exp(−zWt) is a Geometric Brownian Motion,
with state dependent and bounded drift, bounded volatility, and bounded jumps. One checks the
transversality condition (68) by showing that, for each T ≥ 0, E [J(W ∗T , τ∗T )] = e(β−r)TE [J(W0, τ0)],
following exactly the same steps as in Duffie, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen [2004b]. Let’s now consider
any feasible type, consumption and wealth processes (τt, ct,Wt). By Ito’s Lemma
e−βtJ(Wt, τt) = J(W0, τ0) +
∫ T
0
e−βt (DJ − βJ) dt +
∫ T
0
e−βtJW (Wt, τt)
√
σ2(τt) + σ2edBt
+
K∑
k=1
∫ T
0
e−βt
(
J(Wt− + P (τt−, τt))− J(Wt−, τt−)
)(
dNt(k)− γ(k) dt
)
.
The regularity condition (69) implies that the last two integral terms are martingales. On the
other hand, the HJB equations imply that DJ − βJ ≤ exp(−αct). Replacing this inequality into
the previous equation and taking expectations on both sides, we find
−E
[∫ T
0
exp(−αct − βt) dt
]
+ E
[
e−βTJ(WT , τT )
]
≤ J(W0, τ0) (75)
with an equality for (τ∗t , c∗t ,W ∗t ). Then, letting T go to infinity in (75) and using the transversality
condition (68), we find that the investor intertemporal utility is less or equal than J(W0, τ0) with
an equality for (τ∗t , c∗t ,W ∗t ), establishing optimality.
C.4 First-Order Approximation
Let’s assume that x(τ) ≡ Aσ(τ) does not depend on A. We study the family of HJB equations
indexed by A ∈ R:
0 = −rV (τ)+m(τ)−x(τ)+
K∑
k=1
γ(k) max
τ ′(τ,k)∈T ′(τ,k)
H
(
A , V
(
τ ′(τ, k)
)
+P
(
τ, τ ′(τ, k)
)−V (τ)), (76)
for all τ ∈ T , where H(x, y) ≡ (1 − e−xy)/x if x > 0 and H(0, y) = 0. Because the function H
has power series expansion
∑∞
n=1(−1)n(xn−1yn)/n! it is infinitely continuously differentiable for all
(x, y) ∈ R+ × R. We first show that the system (76) of HJB equation has a unique solution at
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A = 0. To see why this is the case one rewrite the system as
V (τ) =
m(τ)− x(τ)
r +
∑K
k=1 γ(k)
+
K∑
k=1
γ(k)
r +
∑K
j=1 γ(j)
max
τ ′(τ,k)∈T ′(τ,k)
(
V
(
τ ′(τ, k)
)
+ P
(
τ, τ ′(τ, k)
))
, (77)
for all τ ∈ T . Equation (77) defines a mapping from RK to itself. The Blackwell sufficient
condition (Stokey and Lucas [1989] page 54) implies that this mapping is a contraction, with
modulus (γ(1)+. . .+γ(K))/(r+γ(1)+. . .+γ(K)) < 1. Therefore, an application of the Contraction
Mapping Theorem (Stokey and Lucas [1989] page 54) shows that the system (77) has a unique
solution that we denote V 0. We let τ0( · , · ) be a policy function achieving the maximum. Given
τ0( · , · ), V 0 solves a system of linear equations that is invertible (because it can also be viewed as
a contraction). We show
Proposition 9 (First-Order Approximation.) If, for all τ ∈ T , τ0(τ, · ) is the unique maxi-
mizer of (77) given V 0, then there exists a neighborhood N1 ⊆ R+ of zero, a neighborhood N2 ⊆ RK
of V 0, and an infinitely continuously differentiable function φ : N1 → N2 such that, for all A ∈ N1,
V is a solution of the system (76) of HJB equations if and only if V = φ(A). Moreover, for all
A ∈ N1, for all τ ∈ T , τ0(τ, · ) is the unique maximizer of (76) given V = φ(A).
We fix τ0( · , · ) and consider the system of equations
G(τ, A, V ) = −rV (τ)+m(τ)−x(τ)+
K∑
k=1
γ(k)H
(
A, V
(
τ0(τ, k)
)
+P
(
τ, τ0(τ, k)
)−V (τ)) = 0, (78)
for all τ ∈ T . The function G is is infinitely continuously differentiable and its Jacobian at
(A, V ) = (0, V 0) is invertible. Therefore an application of the Implicit Function Theorem (see Taylor
and Mann [1983]) provides neighborhoods N˜1 ∈ R+ and N˜2 ∈ RK , and an infinitely continuously
differentiable function φ such that, for all A ∈ N1, H(A, V ) = 0 if and only if V = φ(A). Because
τ0(τ, · ) is the unique maximizer of (77), we know that for all feasible policy function τ ′, τ ′(τ, · ) =
τ0(τ, · ) implies
0 > −rV 0(τ) + m(τ)− x(τ) +
K∑
k=1
γ(k)H
(
0, V 0
(
τ ′(τ, k)
)
+ P
(
τ, τ ′(τ, k)
)− V 0(τ)). (79)
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By continuity of H and φ, these strict inequalities hold in some neighborhood N1 of zero. Therefore,
for all A ∈ N1, V = φ(A) is a solution of the system (76) of HJB equations, and τ0 achieves the
maximum.
D Utilities and Prices
We start by deriving the equations for the types’ utilities and the lending fee. To do so, we need to
expand the set of types, characterizing a high-valuation non-searcher by the state of his borrower.
Depending on whether that agent is a seller si, non-searcher ni, or buyer bi, we denote the high-
valuation non-searcher by nsi, nni, and nbi, respectively. This ensures that transitions across types
are Markovian.
Lender i: The equation is
rVi = δ + x− y + κ(Vsi − Vi) + νiµbo(Vnsi − Vi). (80)
The flow benefit is the certainty equivalent C(ρ, 1) = δ+x−y of holding one share. The transitions
are (i) revert to average valuation at rate κ and become a seller si, and (ii) meet a willing borrower
at rate νiµbo, lend the asset, and become of type nsi.
High-valuation non-searcher nsi: The equation is
rVnsi = δ + x− y + wi + κ(Vsi − Vnsi) + κ(Vi − Vnsi) + λµbi(Vnni − Vnsi). (81)
The flow benefits are the certainty equivalent C(ρ, 1) of holding one share, and the lending fee wi.
The transitions are (i) revert to average valuation at rate κ and become a seller si, (ii) agent si
reverts to average valuation at rate κ and returns the asset, in which case agent nsi becomes a
lender i, and (iii) agent si meets a seller at rate λµbi, in which case agent nsi becomes of type nni.
High-valuation non-searcher nni: The equation is
rVnni = δ + x− y + wi + κ(Ci − Vnni) + κ(Vnbi − Vnni). (82)
The flow benefits are as for type nsi. The transitions are (i) revert to average valuation at rate κ
and seize the collateral Ci, and (ii) agent ni reverts to average valuation at rate κ, in which case
agent nni becomes of type nbi.
High-valuation non-searcher nbi: The equation is
rVnbi = δ + x− y + wi + κ(Ci − Vnbi) + λµsi(Vi − Vnbi). (83)
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The flow benefits are as for type nsi. The transitions are (i) revert to average valuation at rate κ
and seize the collateral Ci, and (ii) agent bi meets a seller at rate λµsi and returns the asset, in
which case agent nbi becomes a lender i.
Seller si: The equation is
rVsi = δ − y + λµbi(pi − Vsi). (84)
The flow benefit is the certainty equivalent C(0, 1) = δ−y of holding one share. The only transition
is to meet a buyer at rate λµbi, sell at price pi, and exit the market.
Borrower bo: The equation is
rVbo = −κVbo +
2∑
i=1
νiµi(Vsi − Vbo). (85)
The flow benefits are zero. The transitions are (i) revert to average valuation at rate κ and exit
the market, and (ii) borrow asset i at rate νiµi and become a seller si.
Low-valuation seller si: The equation is
rVsi = −wi + κ(Vbo − Vsi)− κVsi + λµbi(Vni + pi − Vsi). (86)
The flow benefit is paying the lending fee wi. The transitions are (i) being asked to deliver (because
the high-valuation agent reverts to average valuation at rate κ) and become a borrower, (ii) revert
to average valuation at rate κ and exit the market, and (iii) meet a buyer of asset i at rate λµbi,
sell at price pi, and become a low-valuation non-searcher ni.
Low-valuation non-searcher ni: The equation is
rVni = −δ + x− y − wi + κ(Vbo − Ci − Vni) + κ(Vbi − Vni). (87)
The flow benefits are the certainty equivalent C(ρ,−1) = −δ + x − y of shorting one share, and
paying the lending fee wi. The transitions are (i) being asked to deliver at rate κ, lose the collateral
Ci, and become a borrower, and (ii) revert to average valuation at rate κ and become a buyer bi.
Buyer bi: The equation is
rVbi = −δ − y − wi + κ(−Ci − Vbi) + λµsi(−pi − Vbi). (88)
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The flow benefits are the certainty equivalent C(0,−1) = −δ− y of shorting one share, and paying
the lending fee wi. The transitions are (i) being asked to deliver at rate κ, lose the collateral Ci,
and exit the market, and (ii) meet a seller at rate λµsi, buy at price pi, and exit the market.
Price pi: Using Equation (14) and the definitions of ∆b and ∆si, we find
Vi − pi − Vb = φ(Vi − Vb − Vsi). (89)
The LHS is equal to the trading surplus of the marginal buyer b, and the RHS is equal to the
overall surplus (marginal buyer plus marginal seller) times the bargaining power φ.
Lending fee wi: The counterpart of Equation (89) is
Vnsi − Vi = θ(Vnsi + Vsi − Vi − Vbo) ≡ θΣi, (90)
because the trading surplus of a lender i is Vnsi−Vi, and the overall surplus is the sum of Vnsi−Vi
plus the borrower surplus Vsi − Vbo.
Using Equations (12) and (80)-(90), we will compute the lending fee wi and the price pi as a
function of the short-selling surplus Σi. We will then derive a linear system for Σ1 and Σ2.
D.1 Lending Fee
Subtracting Equation (80) from (81), we find
(r + κ + κ + νiµbo)(Vnsi − Vi) = wi + λµbi(Vnni − Vnsi), (91)
subtracting Equation (81) from (82), we find
(r + κ + κ + λµbi)(Vnni − Vnsi) = κ(Ci − Vsi) + κ(Vnbi − Vi), (92)
and subtracting Equation (82) from (83), we find
(r + κ + κ)(Vnbi − Vnni) = λµsi(Vi − Vnbi). (93)
Equations (92) and (93) imply that
Vnbi − Vnsi = κ
r + κ + κ + λµbi
(Ci − Vsi) + κ(r + κ + κ)− λµsi(r + κ + κ + λµbi)(r + κ + κ)(r + κ + κ + λµbi) (Vnbi − Vi).
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Adding Vnsi − Vi on both sides and solving for Vnbi − Vi, we find
Vnbi−Vi =
(r + κ + κ)(r + κ + κ + λµbi)
(r + κ + κ)(r + κ + λµbi) + λµsi(r + κ + κ + λµbi)
[
κ(Ci − Vsi)
r + κ + κ + λµbi
+ Vnsi − Vi
]
Substituting Vnbi − Vi from this equation into (92), we find
Vnni − Vnsi =
κ(r + κ + κ + λµsi)(Ci − Vsi) + κ(r + κ + κ)(Vnsi − Vi)
(r + κ + κ)(r + κ + λµbi) + λµsi(r + κ + κ + λµbi)
.
Substituting Vnni − Vnsi from this equation into (91), and using Vnsi − Vi = θΣi (i.e., Equation
(90)), we can determine the lending fee as a function of the short-selling surplus:
[
r + κ + κ
(r + κ)(r + κ + κ + λµsi) + λµsi(κ + λµbi)
(r + κ + λµbi)(r + κ + κ) + λµsi(r + κ + κ + λµbi)
+ νiµbo
]
θΣi
= wi +
κλµbi(r + κ + κ + λµsi)
(r + κ + κ)(r + κ + λµbi) + λµsi(r + κ + κ + λµbi)
(Ci − Vsi). (94)
D.2 Price
Equation (84) implies that
Vsi − pi = δ − y − rpi
r + λµbi
. (95)
Subtracting rpi from both sides of Equation (80), and using (90) and (95), we find
Vi − pi =
1
r + κ
[
δ + x− y − rpi + νiµboθΣi + κδ − y − rpi
r + λµbi
]
. (96)
Substituting (95) and (96) into (89), we find
δ − y − rpi + (1− φ)(r + λµbi)
r + κ + (1− φ)λµbi
[
x + νiµboθΣi − (r + κ)Vb
]
= 0. (97)
Substituting d− y − rpi from Equation (97) into (96), we find
Vi − pi =
φ(x + νiµboθΣi) + (1− φ)(r + κ + λµbi)Vb
r + κ + (1− φ)λµbi .
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Substituting Vi − pi from this equation into (12) and solving for Vb, we find
Vb =
φ
∑2
j=1
λµsj
r+κ+(1−φ)λµbj (x + νjµboθΣj)
(r + κ)
[
1 + φ
∑2
j=1
λµsj
r+κ+(1−φ)λµbj
] .
Substituting Vb from this equation into (97), we can determine the price as a function of the
short-selling surplus:
pi =
δ − y
r
+
(1− φ)(r + λµbi)
r [r + κ + (1− φ)λµbi]
⎡
⎣x + νiµboθΣi − φ
∑2
j=1
λµsj
r+κ+(1−φ)λµbj (x + νjµboθΣj)
1 + φ
∑2
j=1
λµsj
r+κ+(1−φ)λµbj
⎤
⎦ . (98)
D.3 Short-Selling Surplus
Adding Equations (81) and (86), and subtracting Equations (85) and (80), we find
(r + κ + κ + νiµboθ)Σi +
2∑
j=1
νjµj(1− θ)Σj = λµbi(Vnni + Vni + pi − Vnsi − Vsi). (99)
Adding Equations (82), (87), and rpi = rpi, and subtracting Equations (81) and (86), we find
(r+κ+κ+λµbi)(Vnni+Vni+pi−Vnsi−Vsi) = rpi−δ+x−y+κ(pi−Vsi)+κ(Vnbi+Vbi+pi−Vi). (100)
Adding Equations (83), (88), and rpi = rpi, and subtracting Equation (80), we find
(r + κ + λµsi)(Vnbi + Vbi + pi − Vi) = rpi − δ − y + κ(pi − Vsi)− νiµboθΣi. (101)
Substituting Vnbi +Vbi+pi−Vi from Equation (101) into (100), and then substituting Vnni+Vni +
pi − Vnsi − Vsi from Equation (100) into (99), we find
[
r + κ + κ + νiµboθ
[
1 +
λµbiκ
(r + κ + κ + λµbi)(r + κ + λµsi)
]]
Σi +
2∑
j=1
νjµj(1− θ)Σj
=
λµbi
r + κ + κ + λµbi
[
x +
r + κ + κ + λµsi
r + κ + λµsi
[rpi − δ − y + κ(pi − Vsi)]
]
. (102)
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To derive an equation involving only Σ1 and Σ2, we need to eliminate the price pi. We have
rpi − δ − y + κ(pi − Vsi)
= −2y + rpi − δ + y + κrpi − δ + y
r + λµbi
= −2y + (1− φ)(r + κ + λµbi)
r + κ + (1− φ)λµbi
⎡
⎣x + νiµboθΣi − φ
∑2
j=1
λµsj
r+κ+(1−φ)λµbj (x + νjµboθΣj)
1 + φ
∑2
j=1
λµsj
r+κ+(1−φ)λµbj
⎤
⎦ ,
where the first step follows from Equation (95) and the second from (98). Plugging back into
Equation (102), we can write it as
aiΣi +
2∑
j=1
fjΣj + bi
2∑
j=1
gjΣj = ci, (103)
where
ai = r+κ+κ+νiµboθ
[
r + κ + κ
r + κ + κ + λµbi
+
φ(r + κ)λµbi(r + κ + κ + λµsi)
(r + κ + κ + λµbi)(r + κ + λµsi)[r + κ + (1− φ)λµbi]
]
,
fi = νiµi(1− θ),
bi =
(1− φ)λµbi(r + κ + κ + λµsi)(r + κ + λµbi)
(r + κ + κ + λµbi)(r + κ + λµsi) [r + κ + λ(1− φ)λµbi] ,
gi = φνiµboθ
λµsi
r+κ+(1−φ)λµbi
1 + φ
∑2
j=1
λµsj
r+κ+(1−φ)λµbj
,
ci =
λµbi
r + κ + κ + λµbi
⎡
⎣x− r + κ + κ + λµsi
r + κ + λµsi
⎡
⎣2y − (1− φ)(r + κ + λµbi)
r + κ + (1− φ)λµbi
x
1 + φ
∑2
j=1
λµsj
r+κ+(1−φ)λµsj
⎤
⎦
⎤
⎦ .
The short-selling surpluses Σ1 and Σ2 are the solution to the linear system consisting of Equation
(103) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Note that the collateral Ci does not enter in Equation (103), and thus does not affect the short-
selling surplus. It also does not affect the price, from Equation (98). It affects only the lending
fee because when lenders can seize more collateral they accept a lower fee. From now on (and as
stated in Footnote 18), we set the collateral equal to the utility of a seller si, i.e.,
Ci = Vsi. (104)
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E Search Equilibrium
In this section we prove Propositions 2-8.
Proof of Proposition 2: From Appendix B we know that given the short-selling decisions ν1 =
ν2 = ν, the types’ measures are uniquely determined. From Appendix D we know that given
any short-selling decisions and types’ measures, the utilities, prices, and lending fees are uniquely
determined. Therefore, what is left to show is (i) the short-selling surplus Σ1 = Σ2 is positive, (ii)
buyers’ and sellers’ reservation values are ordered as in Equation (13), and (iii) agents’ portfolio
decisions are optimal. To show these results, we recall from Appendix B that when search frictions
become small, i.e., λ goes to ∞ holding n ≡ ν/λ constant, µbi converges to mb, µi converges to S,
λµsi converges to gs, and νµbo converges to gbo.
We start by computing Σi, wi, and pi, thus proving Proposition 3. Equation (103) implies that
when Σ1 = Σ2 ≡ Σ,
Σ =
c
a + 2(f + bg)
,
where we suppress the asset subscripts from a, b, c, f, g because of symmetry. When search frictions
become small, a and b converge to positive limits, c converges to
x− r + κ + κ + gs
r + κ + gs
(2y − x), (105)
g converges to zero, and f converges to ∞, being asymptotically equal to νS(1− θ). Therefore, the
surplus converges to zero, and its asymptotic behavior is as in Proposition 3.
Equations (94) and (104) imply that the lending fee is
wi =
[
r + κ + κ
(r + κ)(r + κ + κ + λµsi) + λµsi(κ + λµbi)
(r + κ + λµbi)(r + κ + κ) + λµsi(r + κ + κ + λµbi)
+ νiµbo
]
θΣi.
Because the term in brackets converges to
r + κ + κ
gs
r + κ + κ + gs
+ gbo,
the lending fee converges to zero, and its asymptotic behavior is as in Proposition 3.
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Equation (98) implies that the price is equal to
pi =
δ − y
r
+
1
r
[
1− φr + κ
(1− φ)λmb + o(1/λ)
] [
x + gboθΣi − 2φgsx(1− φ)λmb + o(1/λ)
]
.
Using this equation and the fact that Σi is in order 1/λ, it is easy to check that the asymptotic
behavior (i.e., order 1/λ) of the price is as in Proposition 3.
To show that Σi is positive, we need to show that Equation (105) is positive. This follows
because Equation (17) implies that
x > 2y +
κ
r + κ + gs
(2y − x) > 2y − x + κ
r + κ + gs
(2y − x) = r + κ + κ + gs
r + κ + gs
(2y − x). (106)
We next show that reservation values are ordered as in Equation (13), i.e., ∆bi > ∆b and
∆si > ∆si. For this, we need to compute Vbi and Vni − Vsi. Adding Equations (88) and rpi = rpi,
and using Equation (104), we find
Vbi + pi =
rpi − δ − y − wi + κ(pi − Vsi)
r + κ + λµsi
. (107)
Adding Equations (87) and rpi = rpi, and subtracting Equation (86), we similarly find
Vni + pi − Vsi = rpi − δ + x− y + κ(Vbi + pi) + κ(pi − Vsi)
r + κ + κ + λµbi
. (108)
Inequality ∆bi > ∆b is equivalent to
−Vbi − pi > Vi − pi − Vb
⇔ δ + y − rpi + wi − κ(pi − Vsi)
r + κ + λµsi
>
φ
1− φ(pi − Vsi)
⇔
δ + y − rpi + wi − κ rpi−δ+yr+λµbi
r + κ + λµsi
>
φ
1− φ
rpi − δ + y
r + λµbi
(109)
where the second step follows from Equations (89) and (107), and the third from Equation (95).
Because rpi converges to δ + x− y, and wi converges to zero, the LHS of Equation (109) converges
to (2y − x)/(r + κ + gs), which is positive from Equation (17), while the RHS converges to zero.
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Inequality ∆si > ∆si is equivalent to
Vni + pi − Vsi > pi − Vsi
⇔
x + r+κ+κ+λµsir+κ+λµsi [rpi − δ − y + κ(pi − Vsi)]−
κ
r+κ+λµsi
wi
r + κ + κ + λµbi
>
rpi − δ + y
r + λµbi
,
where the second step follows from Equations (95), (107), and (108). When search frictions become
small, this inequality holds if the limit of the numerator in the LHS exceeds that forss the RHS,
i.e.,
x− r + κ + κ + gs
r + κ + gs
(2y − x) > x.
This holds because of the first inequality in Equation (106).
We finally show that portfolio decisions are optimal. The flow benefit that an average-valuation
agent can derive from a long position in asset i is bounded above by δ−y+wi, and the flow benefit for
a short position is bounded above by −δ−y. Therefore, an average-valuation agent finds it optimal
to establish no position, or to unwind a previously established one, if (δ − y +wi)/r < min{pi, Ci}
and (δ + y)/r > pi. These conditions are satisfied for small frictions because pi converges to
(δ + x− y)/r, wi converges to zero, Ci − pi converges to zero, and 2y > x.
A high-valuation agent finds it optimal to buy asset i if Vi − pi − Vb ≥ 0. This condition is
satisfied because
Vi − pi − Vb =
φ
1− φ(pi − Vsi) =
φ
1− φ
rpi − δ + y
r + λµbi
∼ φ
1− φ
x
λµbi
≥ 0.
The agent then finds it optimal to lend the asset because Vnsi − Vi = θΣi > 0. Likewise, a low-
valuation agent finds it optimal to borrow asset i because Vsi − Vbo = (1− θ)Σi > 0, and to sell it
because Vni + pi − Vsi = pi −∆si > pi −∆si = pi − Vsi > 0. Finally, an arbitrage portfolio is not
profitable because the two assets trade at the same price and carry the same lending fee.
Proof of Proposition 3: See the proof of Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4: We need to show that (i) the short-selling surplus Σ1 is positive and
Σ2 is negative, (ii) buyers’ and sellers’ reservation values are ordered as in Equation (13), and (iii)
agents’ portfolio decisions are optimal. We recall from Appendix B that for small search frictions
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and given the short-selling decisions ν1 = ν and ν2 = 0, µbi converges to mˆbi, µi converges to S,
λµsi converges to gˆsi, and νµbo converges to gˆbo.
We start by computing Σ1, w1, p1, and p2, thus proving Proposition 5. Equation (103) implies
that when ν2 = 0,
Σ1 =
c1
a1 + f1 + b1g1
.
When search frictions become small, c1 converges to
x− r + κ + κ + gˆs1
r + κ + gˆs1
(2y − x), (110)
and the dominant term in the denominator is f1 ∼ νS(1− θ). Therefore, the surplus converges to
zero, and its asymptotic behavior is as in Proposition 5. To determine the asymptotic behavior of
the lending fee and the price, we proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2.
To show that Σ1 is positive, we need to show that Equation (110) is positive. This follows from
Equation (106) and the fact that gˆs1 > gs, established in the proof of Proposition 6. To show that
Σ2 is negative, we note that from Equation (103),
Σ2 =
c2 − (f1 + b2g1)Σ1
a2
=
c2 − f1+b2g1a1+f1+b1g1 c1
a2
.
When search frictions become small, the numerator converges to the same limit as c2 − c1. This
limit is equal to
[
r + κ + κ + gˆs1
r + κ + gˆs1
− r + κ + κ + gˆs2
r + κ + gˆs2
]
(2y − x),
and is negative if gˆs1 > gˆs2. Using Equations (63) and (65), we can write this inequality as
κS + κ+κκ F
mˆb1
>
κS
mˆb
. (111)
Equations (65)-(67) imply that
mˆb =
F − κS
F − κS + F mˆb1. (112)
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Using this equation, we can write Equation (111) as
κS + κ+κκ F
κS
>
F − κS + F
F − κS .
It is easy to check that this inequality holds because of Equation (16).
To show that ∆bi > ∆b and ∆si > ∆si, we proceed as in the proof of Proposition 2. The only
change is that the condition for ∆si > ∆si now is
x− r + κ + κ + gˆs
r + κ + gˆs
(2y − x) > x.
This inequality is implied by the first inequality in Equation (106) and the fact that gˆs1 > gs.
The arguments in the proof of Proposition 2 establish portfolio optimality for all agents except
the arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs could attempt to exploit the price differential in the asymmetric
equilibrium by buying one asset and shorting the other. We next show that buying asset 2 and
shorting asset 1 is unprofitable under
p1 − p2 < w1
r
+
x
λmˆb1
+
κx
r(νS + λmˆb2)
. (113)
(which is implied by (25)), while buying asset 1 and shorting asset 2 is unprofitable under (26).
We then show that Equations (25) and (26) are satisfied if ν/λ is in an interval (n1, n2).
Buy asset 2, short asset 1
Because trading opportunities arrive one at a time, an arbitrageur cannot set up the two legs of
the position simultaneously. The arbitrageur can, for example, buy asset 2 first, then borrow asset
1, and then sell asset 1. Alternatively, he can borrow asset 1 first, then buy asset 2, and then sell
asset 1. The final possibility, which is to sell asset 1 before buying asset 2 is suboptimal. Indeed,
for small search frictions the time to meet a buyer converges to zero while the time to meet a seller
does not. Therefore, the cost of being unhedged converges to zero only when asset 2 is bought
before asset 1 is sold.
Suppose now that the arbitrage strategy is profitable. Because the payoff of the strategy is
decreasing in asset 1’s lending fee, there exists a fee w1 > w1 for which the arbitrageur is indifferent
between following the strategy and holding no position. If for this fee it is optimal to initiate the
strategy by buying asset 2, the arbitrageur can be in three possible states:
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(i) Long position in asset 2. State n2 with utility Vn2.
(ii) Long position in asset 2 and borrowed asset 1. State s1n2 with utility Vs1n2.
(iii) Long position in asset 2 and short in asset 1. State n1n2 with utility Vn1n2.
The utilities are characterized by the following flow-value equations:
rVn2 = δ − y + νµ1(Vs1n2 − Vn2) (114)
rVs1n2 = δ − y − w1 + λµb1(Vn1n2 + p1 − Vs1n2) + κ(Vn2 − Vs1n2) (115)
rVn1n2 = −w1 + κ(Vn2 − C1 − Vn1n2). (116)
When in state n2, the arbitrageur receives the certainty equivalent C(0, 1) = δ − y of holding one
share, and can transit to state s1n2 by borrowing asset 1. When in state s1n2, the arbitrageur
receives δ− y, pays the lending fee w1, can transit to state n1n2 by selling asset 1, and can transit
to state n2 if the lender calls for delivery. Finally, when in state n1n2, the arbitrageur is fully
hedged, pays the lending fee, and can transit to state n2 if the lender calls for delivery. Solving
Equations (114)-(116), we find
rVn2 = δ − y + νµ1
r + κ + νµ1
[
−w1 + λµb1
r + κ + λµb1
[rp1 − δ + y + κ(p1 − C1)]
]
.
The arbitrageur is indifferent between initiating the strategy and holding no position if Vn2 is equal
to p2. Using this condition, and substituting C1 from Equations (95) and (104), we find
w1 =
λµb2
r + λµb2
(rp1 − δ + y)− r + κ + νµ2
νµ2
(rp2 − δ − y).
For small search frictions, this equation becomes
w1 = r(p1 − p2)− rx
λmˆb1
− (r + κ)x
νS
,
and is inconsistent with Equation (113) since w1 < w1.
Suppose instead that it is optimal to initiate the strategy by borrowing asset 1. The arbitrageur
then starts from a state s1, in which he has borrowed asset 1 but holds no position in asset 2. The
utility Vs1 in this state is characterized by
rVs1 = −w1 + λµs2(Vs1n2 − p2 − Vs1), (117)
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because the flow benefit is to pay the lending fee, and the transition is to state s1n2 by buying
asset 1. The utility in states s1n2 and n1n2 is given by Equations (115) and (116), respectively.
The utility in state n2, however, is given by
rVn2 = δ − y + νµ1(Vs1n2 − Vn2) + λµb2(p2 − Vn2) (118)
instead of (114). Indeed, since it it suboptimal to initiate the strategy by buying asset 2, buying
that asset is dominated by holding no position. Therefore, if the arbitrageur finds himself with a
long position in asset 2, he prefers to unwind it upon meeting a seller. Equations (115), (116), and
(118) imply that
Vs1n2 =
r+κ+νµ1+λµb2
r+νµ1+λµb2
(δ − y) + κλµb2r+νµ1+λµb2 p2 − w1 +
λµb1
r+κ+λµb1
[rp1 − δ + y + κ(p1 − C1)]
r(r+κ+νµ1+λµb2)+κλµb2
r+νµ1+λµb2
.
Plugging into Equation (117), and using Equations (95), (104), and the indifference condition which
now is Vs1 = 0, we find
w1 =
λµb1
r+λµb1
(rp1 − δ + y)− r+κ+νµ1+λµb2r+νµ1+λµb2 (rp2 − δ + y)
1 + r(r+κ+νµ1+λµb2)+κλµb2λµs2(r+νµ1+λµb2)
.
For small search frictions, this equation becomes
w1 =
r(p1 − p2)− rxλmˆb1 − κxνS+λmˆb2
1 + r(nS+mˆb2)+κmˆb2gˆs2(nS+mˆb2)
,
and is inconsistent with Equation (113) since w1 < w1.
Buy asset 1, short asset 2
We consider a “relaxed” problem where asset 1 can be bought instantly and asset 2 can be
borrowed instantly at a lending fee of zero. Clearly, if the arbitrage strategy is unprofitable in the
relaxed problem, it is also unprofitable when more frictions are present.
Suppose that the arbitrage strategy is profitable. Because the payoff of the strategy is increasing
in asset 1’s lending fee, there exists a fee w1 < w1 for which the arbitrageur is indifferent between
following the strategy and holding no position. When following the strategy, the arbitrageur is
always in a state where he holds asset 1 and has borrowed asset 2, because these can be done
instantly. If the arbitrageur has not sold asset 2, he can be in four possible states:
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(i) Seeking to lend asset 1. State 1s2 with utility V1s2.
(ii) Lent asset 1 to an agent s1. State ns1s2 with utility Vns1s2.
(iii) Lent asset 1 to an agent n1. State nn1s2 with utility Vnn1s2.
(iv) Lent asset 1 to an agent b1. State nb1s2 with utility Vnb1s2.
If the arbitrageur has sold asset 2, he can be in the four corresponding states that we denote with
n2 instead of s2.
For brevity, we skip the eight flow-value equations, but note that they have a simple solution.
To each outcome concerning asset 1 (1, ns1, nn1, nb1) and to each outcome concerning asset 2
(s2, n2), we can associate a separate utility that we denote by Vˆ . We can then write the utility
of a state (which is a “joint” outcome) as the sum of the two separate utilities. For example, the
utility V1s2 is equal to Vˆ1 + Vˆs2. This decomposition is possible because the outcomes concerning
each asset evolve independently.
The utilities Vˆ1, Vˆns1, Vˆnn1, and Vˆnb1 are characterized by the flow-value equations
rVˆ1 = νµbo(Vˆns1 − Vˆ1)
rVˆns1 = w1 + λµb1(Vˆnn1 − Vˆns1)
rVˆnn1 = w1 + κ(Vˆnb1 − Vˆnn1)
rVˆnb1 = w1 + λµs1(Vˆ1 − Vˆnb1).
and the utilities Vˆs2, Vˆn2 are characterized by
rVˆs2 = δ − y + λµb2(Vˆn2 + p2 − Vˆs2)
rVˆn2 = κ(Vˆs2 − C2 − Vˆn2).
In particular, the flow benefit δ − y is the certainty equivalent from the long position in asset 1,
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which is unhedged when the arbitrageur seeks to sell asset 2. Solving these equations, we find
rV1s2 = rVˆ1 + rVˆs2
=
νµbo
r+νµbo
(
1− λµb1r+λµb1
κ
r+κ
λµs1
r+λµs1
)
1− νµbor+νµbo
λµb1
r+λµb1
κ
r+κ
λµs1
r+λµs1
w1 +
[
δ − y + λµb2
r + κ + λµb2
[rp2 − δ + y + κ(p2 − C2)]
]
.
The arbitrageur is indifferent between initiating the strategy and holding no position if V1s2 is
equal to p1. Using this condition, and substituting C1 from Equations (95) and (104)
νµbo
r+νµbo
(
1− λµb1r+λµb1
κ
r+κ
λµs1
r+λµs1
)
1− νµbor+νµbo
λµb1
r+λµb1
κ
r+κ
λµs1
r+λµs1
w1 = rp1 − δ + y − λµb2
r + λµb2
(rp2 − δ + y).
For small search frictions, this equation becomes
gˆbo
r + κ gˆs1r+κ+gˆs1 + gˆbo
w1 = r(p1 − p2) + rx
λmˆb2
,
and is inconsistent with Equation (26) since w1 > w1.
Equations (25) and (26) are jointly satisfied
The two equations are jointly satisfied if
gˆbo
r + κ gˆs1r+κ+gˆs1 + gˆbo
w1
r
< p1 − p2 < w1
r
.
Substituting p1 and p2 from Equations (21) and (22), we can write this equation as
A1
w1
r
<
B
λ
+ A2
w1
r
<
w1
r
, (119)
where
A2 ≡
gˆbo
r + κ + κ gˆs1r+κ+κ+gˆs1 + gˆbo
< A1 ≡
gˆbo
r + κ gˆs1r+κ+gˆs1 + gˆbo
< 1
and
B ≡ (φr + κ)
(1− φ)
[
1
mˆb2
− 1
mˆb1
]
x
r
> 0.
60
Equation (119) is satisfied if
B
A1 −A2 >
λw1
r
>
B
1−A2 .
In this inequality, n enters only through the product λw1. Therefore, the inequality is satisfied for
some interval n ∈ (n1, n2).
Proof of Proposition 5: See the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 6: We first show a small lemma.
Lemma 1 For χ < 1, inequality (1− χ)mˆb1 > mb is equivalent to
(1− 2χ)(F − χκmˆb1) > χF. (120)
Proof: Since mb is the unique positive solution of Equation (62), whose RHS is decreasing in mb,
inequality (1− χ)mˆb1 > mb is equivalent to
1 >
F
κ(1− χ)mˆb1 + 2κS + κ+κκ F
+
F
2κ(1− χ)mˆb1 + 2κS + κ+κκ F
⇔ 1 > F
F + F − χκmˆb1
+
F
F + F + (1− 2χ)κmˆb1
⇔ F − χκmˆb1
F + F − χκmˆb1
>
F
F + F + (1− 2χ)κmˆb1
,
where the second step follows from Equation (67). It is easy to check that the last inequality implies
Equation (120).
Result (i): We need to show that mˆb1 > mb and gˆs1 > gs. Since Equation (120) holds for χ = 0,
Lemma 1 implies that mˆb1 > mb. Using Equations (60) and (65), we can write inequality gˆs1 > gs
as
κS + κ+κ2κ F
κS + κ+κκ F
mˆb1 < mb.
Using Lemma 1, we then need to show that
(1− 2χ)(F − χκmˆb1) < χF, (121)
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for
χ =
κ+κ
2κ F
κS + κ+κκ F
.
Plugging for χ, we can write Equation (121) as
κS(F − χκmˆb1) < κ + κ2κ FF ,
which holds because of Equation (16) and mˆb1 > 0.
Result (ii): We need to show that mˆb2 < mb and gˆs2 < gs. Using Equations (112) and mˆb2 = mˆb,
we can write inequality mˆb2 < mb as
F − κS
F − κS + F mˆb1 < mb.
Using Lemma 1, we then need to show Equation (121) for
χ =
F
F − κS + F .
Plugging for χ, we can write Equation (121) as
F − κS − F
F − κS + F
(
F − κS + F − κmˆb1
)
< F,
which holds because mˆb1 > 0. Using Equations (60), (63), and (112), we can write inequality
gˆs2 < gs as
F − κS
F − κS + F
κS + κ+κ2κ F
κS
mˆb1 > mb.
Using Lemma 1, we then need to show Equation (120) for
χ =
F
F − κS + F
(
1− κ + κ
2κ
F − κS
κS
)
.
Equation (16) implies that
χ <
F
F − κS + F
(
1− κ + κ
2κ
)
<
F
2(F − κS + F ) ≡ χˆ.
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Because χˆ, mˆb1 > 0, Equation (120) holds for χ if it holds for χˆ. The latter is easy to check using
Equation (16).
Result (iii): Equations (20), (24), and gˆs1 > gs, imply that the short-selling surplus Σi in the
symmetric equilibrium is smaller than Σ1 in the asymmetric equilibrium. Since, in addition, gˆbo >
gbo (from Equations (59) and (64)), Equations (19) and (23) imply that the lending fee wi in the
symmetric equilibrium is smaller than w1 in the asymmetric equilibrium.
Result (iv): For φ = 0, the result follows from Equations (18), (21), mˆb1 > mb > mˆb2, gˆbo > gbo,
and the fact that the short-selling surplus Σi in the symmetric equilibrium is smaller than Σ1 in the
asymmetric equilibrium. An example where the prices of both assets are higher in the asymmetric
equilibrium is S = 0.5, F = 3, F = 5.7, κ = 1, κ = 3, φ = θ = 0.5, r = 4%, δ = 1, x = 0.4, x = 1.6,
y = 0.5, and any n.
Result (v): Social welfare is equal to the PV of the flow benefits derived by all agents. By station-
arity, this is equivalent to the flow benefits derived at a given point in time. Because lending fees
are a transfer, they cancel, and we only need to consider the certainty equivalents associated to the
long and short positions. Summing over agents, we find
2∑
i=1
[
(µi + µni)C(ρ, 1) + µsiC(0, 1) + µniC(ρ,−1) + µbiC(0,−1)
]
, (122)
because long positions are held by high-valuation agents i and ni, and average-valuation agents si,
while short positions are held by low-valuation agents ni, and average-valuation agents bi. Using
Equations (9) and (10) to substitute for µi and µni, and replacing the certainty equivalents by
their values, we can write Equation (122) as
2∑
i=1
[
S(δ + x− y) + µni(x + x− 2y)− µsix− µbi(2y − x)
]
.
When search frictions become small, µsi converges to zero. To determine the limit of
∑2
i=1 µni, we
use Equation (40), summing over assets:
2∑
i=1
µni =
2∑
i=1
νiµboµi
κ + κ
−
2∑
i=1
µsi.
The second term in the RHS converges to zero, while the first term converges to 2gboS/(κ + κ) in
the symmetric case, and gˆboS/(κ+κ) in the asymmetric case. Equations (59) and (64) imply that in
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both cases the limit is F/κ. Therefore, the welfare comparison hinges on
∑2
i=1 µbi. Equation (44)
implies that this converges to F/(κ+gs) in the symmetric case, and F/(κ+ gˆs1) in the asymmetric
case. Since gˆs1 > gs, welfare is higher in the asymmetric case.
Proof of Proposition 7: Generalizing the analysis of Section B.3, we can show that a solution
for ε = 0 exists, and is close to that for small ε. The limiting equations are (55) and
F =
κ
κ + κ
2∑
i=1
αigboSi, (123)
mbi = mb +
καigboSi
(κ + κ)(κ + gsi)
, (124)
gsi =
κSi
mbi
+
αiγboSi
mbi
, (125)
where the supply Si now depends on i.
Result (i): We proceed by contradiction, assuming that for a given S1 − S2 > 0 there exists an
equilibrium where ν1 = ν2 = ν, even when search frictions converge to zero. Since the parameters
ai, bi, ci, and gi in Equation (103) converge to finite limits, while fi converges to ∞, Σi must
converge to zero, and fiΣi to a finite limit. But then Equation (103) implies that the limits of c1
and c2 must be the same. This, in turn, implies that gs1 = gs2 ≡ gs, which from Equations (124)
and (125) means that
κSi + gboSi
mb +
καigboSi
(κ+κ)(κ+gs)
is independent of i, a contradiction when asset supplies differ.
Result (ii): An equilibrium where ν1 = ν and ν2 = 0 can exist if Σ1 > 0 and Σ2 < 0. Condition
Σ1 > 0 can be ensured by Equation (17). For small search frictions, condition Σ2 < 0 is equivalent
to gˆs1 > gˆs2, as shown in the proof of Proposition 4. Using Equations (123) and (125), we can write
condition gˆs1 > gˆs2 as
κS1 +
κ+κ
κ F
mˆb1
>
κS2
mˆb
. (126)
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When asset supplies differ, Equation (67) generalizes to
mˆb1 =
F
κ
−
2∑
i=1
Si − F
κ
, (127)
and Equation (112) to
mˆb =
F − κS2
F − κS2 + F
mˆb1. (128)
Using Equation (128), we can write Equation (126) as
[
κ(S1 − S2) + κ + κ
κ
F
]
(F − κS2) > κS2F . (129)
This equation holds for all values of S1 ≥ S2 because Equation (4) implies that F − κS2 > κS1 ≥
κS2.
Result (iii): The existence condition is now (129), but with S1 and S2 reversed. It does not hold,
for example, when
κ(S2 − S1) + κ + κ
κ
F < 0⇔ S1 > S2 + κ + κ
κκ
F .
Result (iv): When short-selling is concentrated on asset 1, social welfare is determined by µb1,
which converges to F/(κ+ gˆs1) from the proof of Proposition 6. Equations (123), (125), and (127)
imply that
gˆs1 =
κS1 +
κ+κ
κ F
F
κ −
∑2
i=1 Si − Fκ
. (130)
Conversely, when short-selling is concentrated on asset 2, social welfare is determined by µb2,
which converges to F/(κ + gˆs2). Moreover, gˆs2 is determined by Equation (130), but with S1 and
S2 reversed. Since S1 > S2, social welfare is higher when short-selling is concentrated on asset 1.
Proof of Proposition 8: With one asset in supply 2S, the limiting equations of Section B.3
65
become
F = κmb + mbgs,
F =
2κ
κ + κ
gboS,
mb = mb +
2κgboS
(κ + κ)(κ + gs)
,
gs =
2κS
mb
+
2γboS
mb
.
Using m˜ and g˜ to denote their solution, we find
m˜b =
F
κ
− 2S − F
κ
= mˆb1 > mb > mˆb2,
g˜s =
2κS + κ+κκ F
m˜b
> gˆs1 > gs > gˆs2,
g˜bo =
(κ + κ)F
2κS
= gbo =
gˆbo
2
Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 4, we can show that the asset price is asymptotically
equal to
p =
δ + x− y
r
− κ
λm˜b
x
r
− φ(r + κ + g˜s)
λ(1− φ)m˜b
x
r
+
g˜boθΣ
r
, (131)
where
Σ =
x− r+κ+κ+g˜sr+κ+g˜s (2y − x)
ν(1− θ)2S .
Result (i): We compare Equations (18) and (131), noting that m˜b > mb, g˜sm˜b = 2gsmb, g˜bo = gbo,
and that the surplus Σ under integration exceeds Σi in the symmetric equilibrium because g˜s > gs.
Result (ii): To show that p > p2, we compare Equations (22) and (131), noting that m˜b = mˆb1 > mˆb2
and g˜sm˜b = gˆs1mˆb1 + gˆs2mˆb2. An example where p > p1 is S = 0.5, F = 3, F = 5.7, κ = 1, κ = 3,
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φ = θ = 0.5, r = 4%, δ = 1, x = 0.4, x = 1.6, y = 0.5, and n = 0.2. An example where
p < (p1 + p2)/2 is for the same parameter values except φ = 0.
Result (iii): This is because g˜s > gˆs1.
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